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In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to form the 
United Launch Alliance, a joint venture which combined the only two 
suppliers of medium-to-heavy national security related launch services to the 
U.S. government. The Federal Trade Commission reviewed the transaction’s 
antitrust implications and, in consultation with the Department of Defense, 
approved the deal in October 2006 subject to restrictions governing ULA’s 
relationship other satellite manufacturers and providers of launch services. 
The DOD endorsed the transaction on the ground that the joint venture would 
increase launch reliability by concentrating production and launch services 
in a single team rather than subdividing a declining amount of launch vehicle 
production and launch preparation activities between two firms. The FTC’s 
approval rested on two assumptions: that the claimed efficiencies were 
significant, and that the DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration would use best efforts to facilitate entry into the launch 
services sector. Since 2006, ULA has achieved the reliability goals that 
motivated the transaction, and SpaceX has emerged as a principal supplier 
of launch services for NASA and the national security agencies.  This article 
examines the decisions of the DOD and the FTC in 2006 and considers the 
assumptions supporting the 2006 decision in light of subsequent experience. 
The ULA transaction illuminates important issues concerning the analysis of 
efficiencies, entry, and innovation in high tech sectors and highlights how 
public procurement can stimulate competition in concentrated markets. 
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In May 2005, The Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation 
announced plans to form the United Launch Alliance (“ULA”), a joint 
venture which combined the only two suppliers of medium-to-heavy 
(“MTH”) national security related launch services to the United States 
government.13 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) conducted a review 
of the antitrust implications of the transaction and, in consultation with the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”), approved the deal in October 2006 subject 
to restrictions governing ULA’s relationship other satellite manufacturers 
and providers of launch services.14 
 
The transaction confronted DOD and the FTC with difficult questions 
concerning the future of the U.S. national security industrial base and the 
application of competition policy in the aerospace and defense (“A&D”) 
sector. The DOD recommended that the FTC approve the transaction, 15 
mainly on the ground that the joint venture would increase launch reliability 
by concentrating production and launch services in a single team rather than 
subdividing launch vehicle production and launch preparation activities 
between two separate organizations. 16  In the FTC’s review, the DOD’s 
recommendation was decisive.17  By a vote of 5-0, the FTC cleared the 
transaction,18 though it did so with evident reluctance.19 The Commission 
observed: “In the U.S. government MTH launch services market, Boeing and 
Lockheed are the only competitors, and their consolidation will result in a 
 
13 United Launch Alliance, Press Release, Boeing, Lockheed Martin to Form Launch Services Joint 
Venture (May 2, 2005)(hereinafter ULA Formation Press Release), at 
https://www.ulalauanch.com/all_news_items/2005/05/02/boeing-lockheed-martin-to-form-launch-
services-joint-venture.  
14 In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., the Boeing Co. & United Launch Alliance, L.L.C., 51-0165, 
2006 WL 2925257 (F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2006) 
15 Federal Trade Commission, The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation and United Launch 
Alliance: Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 
60148, 60150 (Oct. 12, 2006) (hereinafter FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment). 
16 Kenneth J. Krieg, Undersecretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Letter to Deborah Platt 
Majoras, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 15, 2006) (hereinafter Krieg Letter to Majoras). 
17 Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic, with whom Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras and 
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Join, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., The Boeing Co., and 
United Launch Alliance, L.L.C,, FTC File No. 051 0165, Docket No. C-4188 (Oct. 11, 2006) 
(hereinafter Kovacic Statement), at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165kovacicmajorasrosch.pdf.  
18 Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Intervenes in Formation of ULA Joint Venture by 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin (Oct 3, 2006) (reporting 5-0 vote to accept consent agreement), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/ula.htm.  
19 See, e.g., Concurring Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, The Boeing 
Company/Lockheed Martin Corp., Commission File No. 051-0165 (Oct. 11, 2006) (hereinafter Harbour 
Concurring Statement) (“I reluctantly agree that the Commission must give DOD the benefit of the 
doubt. I therefore vote to accept the proposed consent agreement.”), reprinted in 71 FED. REG. 60151 
(Oct. 12, 2006). 
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monopoly.” 20  The agency concluded that “significant anticompetitive 
effects, including the loss of non-price competition and the loss of future 
price competition, are likely if the proposed transaction is consummated.”21 
 
A key consideration in the FTC’s clearance decision was the prospect of 
future entry in the market for MTH launch services for U.S. government 
customers.22 In 2002, entrepreneur Elon Musk had created a new company, 
Space Exploration Technologies (“SpaceX”), to build launch vehicles that 
could deliver payloads into space at dramatically lower costs than Boeing or 
Lockheed Martin.23  When the FTC reviewed the proposed ULA venture, 
SpaceX had yet to carry out a successful launch of its rocket, the Falcon. The 
Commission offered no view about the ultimate prospects of success for 
SpaceX, but it recited the formidable barriers that the company would face 
in gaining acceptance from, and contracts with, government purchasers.24 
Emphasizing that “the U.S. government only procures MTH launch services 
and space vehicles from firms with a well-established track record for 
success,” the Commission concluded “new entry is unlikely to reverse the 
anticompetitive effects of the Proposed Joint Venture.”25 
 
Notwithstanding this gloomy forecast, the FTC attempted to elicit 
commitments from the government buyers to take steps that would qualify 
SpaceX as a one of their suppliers. Before approving the transaction, the FTC 
received spoken assurances from the DOD and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) that these government customers would use 
best efforts to facilitate new entry – most notably, by SpaceX – to compete 
to supply the U.S. government with launch services.26  These assurances 
were not included in the terms of the consent agreement between the FTC 
and ULA, nor did the correspondence between the FTC and the government 
buyers set out specific commitments.27 The DOD’s written statements to the 
 
20 FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60149. 
21 Id. at 60150. 
22 Id. at 60150 (discussing possible entry into the MTH launch services market for U.S. government 
customers). 
23 In 1995 Musk founded Zip2, which Compact purchased for $307 million in 1999.  Musk invested 
most of the $22 million he made from the sale of Zip2 into a start-up that became PayPal, which Ebay 
acquired in 2002 for $1.5 billion.  Musk took $100 million of his share of the PayPal proceeds and used 
it to begin SpaceX in 2002 and then spent $70 million to create Tesla in 2003.  Musk’s business career 
is examined extensively in Ashlee Vance, ELON MUSK – TESLA, SPACEX AND THE QUEST FOR A 
FANTASTIC FUTURE (2015). 
24 FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60149-50. 
25 Id. at 60150. 
26 I base this observation on my own participation in discussions with the DOD and NASA officials who 
participated in the review of the ULA transaction. 
27 See infra Part III (describing spoken and written interactions between the FTC and the government 
purchasing agencies about the possible future role of SpaceX as a supplier of MTH launch services to 
the DOD and NASA). 
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FTC contained only vague aspirations for new entry, 28  yet the 
Commissioners perceived that these spoken assurances were not perfunctory. 
We perceived that the DOD and NASA were aware of the difficulties they 
would encounter if they became irretrievably beholden to a supplier with 
unassailable monopoly power. The board’s collective intuition was that the 
government purchasers would make good faith efforts to encourage entry by 
other firms as a way to motivate ULA. 
 
In a statement issued on the day the FTC approved the ULA joint venture, I 
said “[t]he ex post evaluation of the ULA settlement and other decisions 
involving competition policy in the defense industry will be a useful 
ingredient of future discussions between the FTC and DOD.”29 This Article 
is an effort, nearly fifteen years later, to begin the promised assessment. This 
Article considers how well the assumptions that supported the approval of 
the ULA transaction have played out in practice. In assessing the joint 
venture’s impact to date, this Article focuses on the judgments that the FTC 
made about (a) the parties’ efficiency argument concerning scale economies 
and reliability and (b) the prospects for future entry by companies to compete 
for launch services contracts with government purchasers. 
 
The conclusions drawn here are necessarily tentative, as the transaction’s full 
impact will not become evident for years to come. Nonetheless, two 
developments to date stand out. First, ULA thus far has met the reliability 
expectations that guided the analysis of the DOD and the FTC.  From its first 
days of operation through July 30, 2020, ULA has made 140 consecutive 
launches without a failure.30 The venture has achieved, and surpassed, the 
reliability goals that the companies advanced in 2005-2006 as the key 
rationale for their collaboration. This is a striking achievement in a field of 
endeavor in which aerospace firms can never take success for granted. 
Building reliable launch vehicles and delivering payloads to their intended 
destinations in space are exceedingly hard tasks. Even a small lapse in 
design, assembly, or operation of the powerful, complex machines that send 
satellites and humans into space can have calamitous consequences. 
 
 
28 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 (“While the Atlas V and Delta IV are currently the 
only launch vehicles capable of meeting current requirements, the Department is open to new U.S. 
competitors for the launch services.  The EELV acquisition strategy provides an annual 
opportunity for new competitors to qualify for launch services contracts by responding to the 
annual Notification of Contracting Action, which sets forth the details of the qualification process 
and is published prior to each year’s Request for Proposals.”). 
29 Kovacic Statement, supra note 6, at 2. 
30 United Launch Alliance, Press Release, United Launch Alliance Atlas V Successfully Launches Mars 
2020 Mission for NASA  (July 30, 2020), at https://www.ulalaunch.com/about/news/2020/07/30/united-
launch-alliance-atlas-v-successfully-launches-mars-2020-mission-for-nasa.  
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Second, the new suppliers of launch services (SpaceX and others) have made 
remarkable progress toward becoming credible alternatives for NASA, the 
national security agencies, and for commercial buyers. Ashlee Vance, author 
of the leading biography of Elon Musk, observes that “SpaceX has become 
the free radical trying to upend everything about this industry.”31 Journalist 
Christian Davenport  adds, “SpaceX went from a rich man’s folly that no one 
took seriously to a disrupter that transformed the aerospace industry.”32 It is 
unlikely that anyone (perhaps even Elon Musk) imagined in 2006 that in 
2020 a SpaceX rocket and spacecraft would carry two American astronauts 
safely to and from the International Space Station and restore the ability of 
the United States to launch humans from its own spaceports into earth orbit.33 
 
The ULA case study serves several purposes. First, the review of the ULA 
venture illuminates how the DOD and the FTC resolved difficult issues 
involving competition, innovation, entry, and efficiency in a technologically 
complex and dynamic sector whose performance is essential to national 
security. Second, the ULA venture suggests broader lessons about how 
competition authorities can account for innovation effects in high technology 
markets.  Third, the ULA experience underscores the importance of public 
procurement policy in shaping the competitive environment. The ULA case 
study suggests how government procurement agencies might account for 
competition in ways that increase the number and quality of options available 
to government buyers and to purchasers in commercial markets. Finally, the 
discussion suggests how a detailed reconstruction of individual enforcement 
decisions can inform assessments about the design and implementation of 
competition policy. 
 
31 Vance, supra note 12, at 217. 
32 Christian Davenport, Ascendant SpaceX plants flag on field long owned by Boeing, WASH. POST, May 
24, 2020, at G1.  In another account,  Davenport noted that SpaceX “has become one of the most 
improbable stories in the history of American enterprise, a combination of disruption, failure and 
triumph that has transformed it from a spunky start-up to an industry powerhouse with some 7,000 
employees.” Christian Davenport, As it prepares to fly humans, SpaceX faces the biggest challenge in 
its history, WASH. POST, May 17, 2020, at A1 (hereinafter Biggest Challenge). 
33 On May 30, 2020, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launched NASA astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug 
Hurley into earth orbit from Cape Canaveral.  The astronauts rode in a SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule 
and successfully docked with the International Space Station on May 31. Irene Klotz, NASA’s New Era, 
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 15-28, 2020, at 22 (hereinafter NASA’s New Era). After 62 days at the 
ISS, Behnken and Hurley returned safely to Earth on August 2.  Jacob Bogage & Christian Davenport, 
NASA astronauts aboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon capsule splash down in the Gulf of Mexico, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 2, 2020, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/02/spacex-return-
updates/?hypid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_spacex-445pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans. This was the first 
time since the discontinuation of NASA’s space shuttle program in 2011, after the return of the Space 
Shuttle Atlantis in July of that year, that Americans had ridden into space on a launch that originated 
within the United States.  Christian Davenport & Jacob Bogage, SpaceX takes historic flight headed for 
space station, WASH. POST, May 31, 2020, at A1.  After NASA ended the shuttle program, the United 
States had to purchase seats on Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft to reach the ISS.  Christian Davenport, 
SpaceX shuttle successfully hurls into orbit, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2019.  By 2015, the cost of a seat on a 
Soyuz flight to the ISS was $81.9 million.  Christian Davenport, SpaceX’s rockets come under safety 
experts’ glare, WASH. POST, May 6, 2018, at A1, A13 (hereinafter Safety Experts’ Glare). 
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The inquiry attempted here is timely for current debates about competition 
law and policy. Some commentators have criticized modern antitrust 
enforcement for adopting a single-minded focus on the output and pricing 
effects of business practices and ignoring other important considerations, 
such as the impact of these practices on innovation and the development of 
new products and services.34  A suggestion in this critique is that public 
enforcement policy requires a dramatic reorientation that puts innovation and 
quality related concerns front and center in policy analysis, especially for 
mergers, and applies entirely new analytical tools to determine how conduct 
and market structure affect innovation. The ULA episode reminds us that 
innovation is not a novel antitrust issue and that innovation effects have been 
paramount (or at least coequal with price effects) in major categories of 
antitrust matters—especially for aerospace and defense industry 
transactions.  Since World War II, attaining qualitative superiority has been 
an overriding objective of national defense policy. 35  Federal antitrust 
enforcement policy has reflected the primacy of innovation as a guarantor of 
U.S. supremacy in the design and production of weapon systems.36   In taking 
this approach, the antitrust agencies have embraced the view of 
commentators who argue that the preservation of independent centers of 
 
34 See William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 
CHI. L. REV. 459, 460 & n.3 (2020) (collecting commentary critical of a “consumer welfare” framework 
that ignores considerations other than output and pricing levels). 
35 The importance of maintaining qualitative superiority as the chief concern of modern U.S. weapons 
acquisition policy is discussed in William B. Burnett & Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Industry, in 
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 289 (Walter Adams ed., 8th ed., 1990). 
36 See, e.g., Joint Statement of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on 
Preserving Competition in the Defense Industry (Apr. 12, 2016) (“In the defense industry, the Agencies 
are especially focused on ensuring that defense mergers will not adversely affect short- and long-term 
innovation crucial to our national security . . . .”), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2016/04/ftc-doj-statement-preserving-competition-defense; J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust 
Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L.REV. 111, 112 (2002) (hereinafter Antitrust Review) 
(“A major goal of antitrust in the defense industry is preserving the number of innovators and 
innovation paths in a setting where, ex ante, the right innovation path is not obvious.”); J Robert Kramer 
II, Chief, Litigation II Section, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Considerations 
in International Defense Mergers (Presentation before the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, May 4, 1999). In explaining the Justice Department decision to oppose the proposed 
merger of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, Antitrust Division official Robert Kramer 
observed: “While the [DOJ]complaint alleged significant price effects, I think it’s fair to say the 
principal driver of our challenge was the merger’s effect on innovation.  As the Attorney General 
indicated when the case was filed, a loss of innovation can literally have life and death implications for 
our servicemen and women.”  Id. at 12-13. For launch vehicles and other complex aerospace and 
defense systems, the benefits from using competition among two or more suppliers to generate cost 
savings to the DOD are highly uncertain, or doubtful, when the number of units acquired falls below a 
certain level.  See National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee, Economic Modelling of 
the Effects of Lot Buys and Competition on Government Expenditures for EELV for FY2013 to FY 2017, 
at 8-10, 14-27 (Jan. 2012) (discussing experience with dual-sourcing major weapon systems and 
implications for DOD acquisition of launch services).  
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inventive activity should be the foremost antitrust concern in reviewing 
defense mergers.37   
 
A second timely aspect of a review of the ULA transaction is the light it sheds 
on the many forms of government intervention that constitute a nation’s 
competition policy. The prosecution of antitrust cases is but one way by 
which governments can help foster competition and stimulate business 
rivalry.38  Perhaps most important, the ULA episode illuminates the power 
of public procurement policy, including funding of private sector research 
and development and the acquisition of goods and services, to influence the 
course of competition.39  A key part of the ULA story is how government 
agencies—first NASA, and later the DOD—used their funding and 
purchasing decisions to facilitate entry into the space launch services market 
by SpaceX and other private firms.40  Through policies that can be correctly 
characterized as procompetitive, the government purchasers helped catalyze 
new entry that transformed a sector seemingly destined to be the province of 
two firms or a single survivor.  NASA, in particular, experimented with a 
new business model to inject more rivalry into the launch services sector. 
The ULA experience provides inspiration to ask how government 
procurement policy could achieve similar results in other concentrated 
sectors of the U.S. economy. 
 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts the background of ULA’s 
creation and examines the competition policy reviews carried out by the 
DOD and the FTC. Part II sketches the modern framework for antitrust 
analysis of aerospace and defense industry mergers and describes significant 
analytical and policy trends. Part III reviews how the FTC and the DOD 
 
37 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood, Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense 
Industry Consolidation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 102-03 (1994) (“Competition’s greatest benefit in 
weapons acquisition arguably is its power to spur firms to devise ingenious approaches for 
fulfilling DoD’s mission requirements. . . . The main potential hazard of mergers is the danger that 
technological competition will diminish, and that specific technologies may become entrenched as 
the one or two remaining suppliers freeze out innovative design approaches that threaten their 
vested interests or defy conventional wisdom.”). 
38 The distinction between “antitrust” and a broader notion of “competition policy” is developed in R. 
Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their Relevance for 
Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16 
(Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995).  Antitrust agencies have come to realize that, in executing their own 
mandates, it is valuable to complement a law enforcement program with the application of non-litigation 
tools such as advocacy before other government agencies, the preparation of reports, and the convening 
of public hearings.  More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation with Tim 
Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005). 
39 The significance of these policy tools as stimulants for competition is examined in William E. 
Kovacic, Government Support for Research and Development, in THE SHRINKING INDUSTRIAL BASE: 
RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ENSURING AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS FOR THE 
1990S (Annual Meeting Program Volume, American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, 
Aug. 1990). 
40 See infra Part V.A. 
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evaluated the ULA joint venture proposal and spells out the considerations 
that guided the FTC’s decision to allow the transaction to proceed with few 
qualifications. Part IV recounts experience in the MTH launch services 
sector over the past decade, emphasizing the impact of the ULA transaction 
on reliability and the development of potential rivals to ULA. Part V 
examines the policy implications of the ULA experience, including 
observations about the application of competition policy to mergers in high 
technology sectors in which innovation is a preeminent competitive concern. 
Part VI concludes. 
 
Before getting started, I note two sets of professional experiences relevant to 
the ULA transaction and the A&D sector generally. First, in describing and 
interpreting the review by the DOD and the FTC of the ULA proposal, I am 
not a neutral observer. I was a member of the FTC from January 2006 
through September 2011, and I participated in the agency’s deliberations 
about the ULA joint venture from January 2006 until early October 2006. I 
voted in favor of the Commission’s decision to approve the deal with 
conditions. Although I conclude in this Article that developments to date 
indicate the FTC made a sound judgment about the ULA transaction in 2006, 
the discussion below underscores the risks and uncertainties that surrounded 
the agency’s assessment.41  The Article identifies where I  have gone beyond 
publicly available source materials and drawn upon my own recollection of 
events. 
 
A second set of experiences outside the FTC informs my understanding of 
the A&D sector and how the application of antitrust and government 
procurement rules affect its performance. I was an associate with the Bryan 
Cave law firm from 1983 to 1986 and, after going to academia, served as of 
counsel to the firm from 1990 to 1998. With Bryan Cave I worked on various 
projects for McDonnell Douglas (“MD”), though none involved the 
company’s launch vehicle division, which Boeing acquired in 1998 when it 
bought MD.  In the early to mid-1990s, I wrote papers for the RAND 
Corporation on topics related to competition in the defense industry, and I 
participated in a project led by Booz Allen Hamilton in 1999-2000 for the 
U.S. Air Force on the future of competition in the launch vehicles sector. 
 
Individuals who have worked in the private sector, or done consulting for 
organizations whose clients include public institutions (such as NASA and 
the U.S. Air Force) responsible, as buyers and regulators, for engaging with 
private suppliers sometimes are  appointed to senior leadership positions in 
government agencies. When this happens, there are recurring, legitimate 
questions about the world view that such appointees  bring to public service 
 
41 See infra notes XX and accompanying text. 
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and how that world view affects their  decisions as government officials. 
Before coming to the FTC, first as General Counsel from 2001 to 2004 and 
then as a member of the board from January 2006 through September 2011, 
I had written a number of academic papers that set out my learning from 
earlier professional experiences and my normative views about competition 
in the aerospace and defense sector.42  Collectively, these papers provide a 
comprehensive view of the policy preferences that guided my thinking about 
the ULA transaction in 2006. 
 
I.  FORMATION OF THE UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE JOINT VENTURE 
 
In May 2005, following extensive consultations with the DOD and other 
government customers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin (“LM”) announced 
plans to form the United Launch Alliance joint venture.43 The companies 
planned to combine engineering and administrative functions near LM’s 
offices in Denver and to consolidate design and production work at Boeing’s 
Decatur, Alabama facility.44 The firms also would unify their launch site 
operations staffs at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base.45  ULA 
would sustain production of the firms’ families of launch vehicles (Delta for 
Boeing, and Atlas for Lockheed Martin), but the production work would be 
performed by a team that integrated personnel from the two companies.46 
 
 
42 William E. Kovacic, Toward the Development of a Unified Trans-Atlantic Defense Procurement 
Market, 2006 Ford. Corp. L. Inst. 179 (Barry Hawk ed., 2007); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy 
Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements by Government Agencies and the Courts, in 
SUBCONTRACTING, TEAMING AND PARTNERING IN THE AGE OF CONSOLIDATION AND COOPERATION 
(American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Nov. 1997); William E. Kovacic, 
Government Support for Research and Development, in THE SHRINKING INDUSTRIAL BASE: 
RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ENSURING AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS FOR THE 
1990S (American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Aug. 1990); William E. Kovacic, 
The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Public Regulation of the Weapons Acquisition Process, in ARMS, POLITICS, 
AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 104 (Robert Higgs ed., 1990); 
William E. Kovacic, Blue Ribbon Defense Commissions: The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems, in 
ARMS, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 61 (Robert 
Higgs, ed. 1990); William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001); William E. Kovacic, 
Competition in the Postconsolidation Defense Industry, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 421 (1999); William E. 
Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood, Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 91 1994); William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government 
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCIENCES 29 (1992); William E. Kovacic, Commitment in Regulation: Defense 
Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps, 3 J. REG. ECON. 219 (1991); William E. Kovacic, Merger 
Policy in a Declining Defense Industry, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 543 (1991); William E. Kovacic, Antitrust 
Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1059 (1990); William B. Burnett & William E. Kovacic, Reform of U.S. Weapons 
Acquisition Policy: Competition, Teaming Arrangements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YALE J. REG. 249 
(1989); William E. Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57 Antitrust L.J. 517 (1988) 





The parties advanced two principal rationales for the transaction. First, the 
consolidation would yield hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings 
through the elimination of personnel redundancies and superior operational 
integration.47 These savings, in turn, would reduce the price that government 
purchasers paid for launch services. 
 
The second, and more important, justification involved scale economies.48 
Falling demand for launch services, for national security purposes and for 
commercial applications, had reduced production rates (referred to in the 
industry as “tempo”49) for both firms.50  Over time, a smaller number of 
launches was being subdivided between the two organizations.  As a result, 
neither Boeing nor Lockheed Martin could realize the learning benefits that 
come from more extensive experience. Diminished experience reduced the 
proficiency of each team and increased the risk of launch failures, which 
could deny the DOD needed access to critical communications and 
reconnaissance satellites.51 
 
The companies stated that the combination of all experience in a single, 
integrated team would raise capability and improve performance above 
levels that prevailed when Boeing and Lockheed Martin maintained 
independent design and production teams. When the ULA venture was 
announced, Boeing’s Chief Executive Officer, James Bell, explained: “By 
joining together, we are convinced that we can provide the customer with 
assured access to space at the lowest possible cost while ensuring enhanced 
reliability by eliminating duplicative infrastructure and bringing experts from 
both companies to focus on mission assurance.”52 Daniel Collins, a Boeing 
executive appointed to be the new ULA chief operating officer, added: “The 
continued performance of Boeing and Lockheed Martin employees as a new 
team going forward – from the engineering center to the factory floor to the 




47 The press release announcing formation of the venture said: “Based upon initial estimates, annual 
savings to the government resulting from the combination are expected to be approximately $100-150 
million.”  Id. 
48 As stated in one classic account, scale economies “result when the increased size of a single 
operating unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit cost of production or 
distribution.  Alfred Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 17 
(Belknap Press, 1990). 
49 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 3 (defining “launch tempo” as “the number of 
booster cores built in the assembly line and launched per year”). 
50 See FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60150 (reviewing concerns about falling 
levels of launches and the distribution of a declining amount of work across two workforces). 
51 Id. 
52 ULA Formation Press Release, supra note 2, at 2. 
53 Id. at 2-3. 
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The companies did not directly address the possibility that the unification of 
MTH launch services capability in a single enterprise might not serve the 
government’s best interests over time. The companies hinted that concerns 
about pricing for future launches would be alleviated through the continued 
application of the government’s systems for monitoring costs and that, in any 
event, the gains from consolidation were compelling. At the time ULA was 
announced, Lockheed Martin’s Chief Executive Officer, Robert Stevens, 
said “It has become increasingly clear that an alliance of launch capabilities 
is essential to meet the space communications, surveillance and 
reconnaissance needs of the 21st century, and to assure access to space.”54 
Stevens added that the ULA joint venture “will permit our national customers 
to achieve their mission objectives while reflecting current budget pressures 
and providing the government with full cost visibility.”55 
 
In 2005, students of the companies had reason to doubt the sanguine 
assessment of the Boeing and LM executives about how the new venture 
would achieve a synthesis of capability that surpassed what the firms could 
achieve acting independently. For several years before the ULA venture was 
announced, Boeing and LM had engaged in bitter litigation involving 
competition to provide launch services to the DOD. Lockheed Martin had 
sued Boeing for alleged misconduct in competing for awards in the Air Force 
Extended Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (EELV) and accused Boeing 
of violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the 
Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal Activities Act, the Sherman Act, and 
the Florida Antitrust Act.56 In the same case Boeing filed a counterclaim 
alleging that LM had engaged in unfair competition and tortious interference 
with contractual relations and had violated the Lanham Act and the Florida 
Unfair Deceptive and Trade Practices Act.57 The agreement to create ULA 
stipulated that, upon the closing of the transaction, the companies would seek 
an order to suspend their litigation in federal district court concerning the Air 
Force EELV program.58 
 
II. THE PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY MERGERS: MODERN TRENDS 
 
 
54 Id. at 1. 
55 Id. 
56 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (M.D. Fl. 2004).   
57 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15365 (U.S.D.C. Md. FL., Mar. 
21, 2005). 
58 ULA Formation Press Release, supra note 2, at 3.  Regarding the pending litigation between the two 
companies, LM CEO Robert Stevens said: “The mission of this joint venture is to reliably meet critical 
launch needs, so it is imperative that the two teams come together as one with all lingering issues 
resolved.  When agreement was reached to form this alliance, both parties agreed that they were ready 
to move forward with a clean slate and an undistracted focus on mission success.”  Id. 
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The review of mergers involving defense contractors involves contributions 
from the U.S. antitrust agencies (the DOJ and the FTC) and the government 
purchasing agencies (e.g., DOD). The DOJ and the FTC assess the 
compatibility of transactions with the federal antitrust laws. The defense 
purchasing authorities provide their views to the antitrust agencies and 
determine whether the transaction satisfies government procurement 
requirements governing matters such as the assignability of government 
contracts. As described below, the government buyers do not control the 
antitrust analysis, but their views carry considerable weight in decisions by 
the DOJ or the FTC to attempt to block a merger, to accept a settlement, or 
to clear a transaction without conditions. 
 
A. Antitrust Review Process 
 
The principal mechanism for federal antitrust scrutiny of mergers and joint 
ventures is Section 7 of the Clayton Act,59 which forbids consolidations 
whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition.” 60  Proposed 
transactions above certain size thresholds must be notified in advance to the 
federal antitrust agencies.61  The federal antitrust agencies have a protocol 
that determines which agency will review the matter. Allocations made under 
the interagency “clearance” procedure are based on the relative levels of 
expertise of each agency regarding the products and firms in question. 
 
Once the parties have notified the transaction, the federal antitrust agency 
ordinarily has 30 days to decide whether to request additional information. 
Pending the parties’ compliance with this “second request,” the transaction 
may not be completed.62  Once the parties have complied with the second 
request, the antitrust agency has 30 days to decide whether to seek an 
injunction in federal court to block the transaction or to accept a settlement 
to resolve potential competitive problems.63 If the agency takes no action 
within the 30-day period, the parties can consummate the transaction. The 
deadlines set in this framework can be (and sometimes are) extended by 
agreement between the agency and the parties.64 If the DOJ or the FTC desire 
to block a proposed merger, the agency must seek an injunction in federal 
 
59 15 U.S.C § 18 (2018). 
60 Id. See Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker & Joshua D. Wright, ANTITRUST 
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 672-74 (3d ed. 
2017) (describing the antitrust legal framework for merger control in the United States).  
61 Gavil et al., supra note 45, at 722-26. 
62 Id. at 723-24. 
63 Id. at 723. 
64 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 411-12 (8th ed 2017) (hereinafter 
Antitrust Law Developments). 
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district court. Neither agency has the power, acting on its own, to prohibit a 
transaction.65 
 
In cases involving defense industry mergers, the question of whether and 
how officials from the government purchasing agency will testify, and 
whether they will endorse or oppose the merger, are crucial factors in 
determining how the antitrust agencies will proceed.66  Since the mid-1980s 
until 2005 when Boeing and Lockheed notified their agreement to the U.S. 
antitrust agencies, the DOJ and the FTC had reviewed numerous proposed 
mergers involving firms in the aerospace and defense industry.67 Between 
them, the two federal antitrust agencies had examined a number of 
transactions involving either Boeing or Lockheed Martin.  The FTC cleared 
Boeing’s purchase of McDonnell Douglas and permitted Boeing to acquire 
the satellite division of Hughes, subject to conditions.68 The DOJ accepted 
settlements that permitted Lockheed to acquire Marietta and the combat 
aircraft operations of General Dynamics.69 In the late 1990s, the DOJ sued to 
block Lockheed Martin from purchasing Northrop Grumman, causing the 
parties to abandon the merger.70 
 
By the time the ULA joint venture was announced in 2005, several trends 
had emerged in antitrust reviews by the DOJ, the FTC, and the federal courts. 
The federal agencies generally had challenged transactions that threatened to 
reduce from 2 to 1 the number of suppliers for weapon systems or inputs to 
those systems. The agencies had opposed such “mergers to monopoly” in 
matters involving tank ammunition (Olin/Alliant),71 image intensifier tubes 
used in making night vision devices (Imo/Optic Electronics),72 submarine 
design and construction (General Dynamics/Newport News Shipbuilding),73 
 
65 Id. at 422-23. 
66 Kramer, Antitrust Review, supra note 25, at 111 (“The DOD is, of course, for the antitrust agencies 
the critical witness in any enforcement action; a status that stems from its role as sole buyer of many 
products.”); William E. Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood,  Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense 
Industry Consolidation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (1994); William E. Kovacic, Competition policy in the 
postconsolidation defense industry, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 421, 430-32, 470-75 (1999) (hereinafter 
Postconsolidation Defense Industry). 
67 The most intensive period of activity took place in the 1990s.  See Kovacic, Postconsolidation 
Defense Industry, supra note 55, at 422-23. 
68 William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and 
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001); Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense 
Industry, supra note 55, at 422-23. 
69 Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra note 55, at 422-23. 
70 Id. at 468-75.  
71 FTC v, Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992). 
72 FTC v. Imo, Inc., 1992-2 Tr. Cas. (CCH) ¶69,843 (D.D.C. 1988). 
73 Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Files Suit to Block General Dynamics’ 
Purchase of Newport News Shipbuilding (Oct. 23, 2001), at 
http://www.usdoj,gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8366.htm.  
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and defense electronics systems (Lockheed Martin/Northrop Grumman).74  
Few cases had been litigated to a resolution on the merits, and in each of 
these decisions the district court had enjoined the merger (e.g., Olin/Alliant). 
 
The aversion of the antitrust agencies towards these 2 to 1 defense industry 
mergers was not absolute. In a few cases, the antitrust authorities had 
approved mergers to monopoly. Raytheon was permitted to purchase the 
tactical missiles division of Hughes without conditions, and the FTC’s 
unconditional clearance of Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell Douglas 
combined the only two U.S. suppliers of aerial refueling tankers.75 More 
recently, in 2013, the FTC approved a merger to monopoly between 
Gencorp’s Aerojet division and Pratt & Whitney’s Rocketdyne division.76 
These rare approvals have rested heavily on recommendations from the DOD 
regarding the likely volume of future purchases of the system in question and 
the costs associated with sustaining two independent design and production 
teams. 
B. The Role of the Government Purchaser 
 
Olin’s unsuccessful attempt in 1992 to purchase the tank ammunition 
operations of Alliant spurred important changes in the role of the government 
purchasers and their cooperation with the DOJ and the FTC in merger 
reviews. Faced with a 2 to 1 merger, the FTC sued in federal court 
to block the tank ammunition deal. 77  The merging parties defended the 
merger on the ground that the transaction was the only suitable way to ensure 
that key capabilities were preserved amid declining production volumes that 
made a down-select to one firm inevitable.78 
 
Some constituencies within the Department of the Army agreed with the 
parties and favored the transaction. At the trial, the merging parties called a 
senior Army official to appear as a witness.79 Against a backdrop of active 
discussions between the DOD and the FTC, the DOD front office instructed 
the Army official to give testimony that was faintly and ambiguously 
supportive to Olin and Alliant. Under examination by the trial judge, the 
 
74 United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp. Case No. 4332, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 23, 1998) (complaint challenging proposed acquisition by Lockheed Martin of Northrop 
Grumman). 
75 William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 444-47 (2003). 
76 Spaceflight Now, Two Engine Rivals Merge Into Aerojet Rocketdyne (June 18, 2013), at 
https://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1306/18aerojet/#.U0GsKf1gNuY.    
77 FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992).  
78 Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra note 55, at 430-32. 
79 Id. at 431. 
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Army official reported that he was permitted to say only that the Army “has 
no objection to the proposed merger” and “takes no official position 
concerning the antitrust implications of the transaction.”80 When pressed by 
the judge to offer a view about whether the DOD affirmatively supported the 
merger, the Army official demurred. Hearing no positive backing for the deal 
from the DOD, the judge sustained the FTC’s request for an injunction.81 
Had the DOD, in giving its professional opinion about the transaction’s 
impact on national security, testified squarely in favor of the deal, one 
suspects that the judge would not have enjoined the merger. 
 
The near collision between the DOD and the FTC in the courtroom in 
Olin/Alliant inspired the creation of a Defense Science Board (DSB) 
advisory panel which recommended, among other steps, closer coordination 
between the antitrust agencies and the DOD involving proposed defense 
mergers. 82  The DOD created a liaison office to work with the antitrust 
authorities to gather information and to present a coherent statement of the 
DOD’s opinion about specific transactions.83 In organizational terms, DOD 
is not a single-minded institution. The Department embodies a large 
collection of subsidiary bodies. Within such a complex institution, it is 
unsurprising that there might be varied (and contested) views about the 
merits of a proposed merger. The liaison process reforms were designed to 
assist the Department in formulating a single institutional recommendation 
and to communicate its opinion to the antitrust agencies.  The liaison process 
also provided a useful means for the DOJ and the FTC to explain their own 
decision-making methodology and to identify factors that mattered the most. 
 
The operation of the enhanced liaison mechanism improved communications 
between the antitrust agencies and the government purchasers, especially by 
engaging the two groups in data collection and substantive discussions early 
in the life cycle of the transaction. The results were evident in the DOJ’s 
successful efforts to block Lockheed Martin’s attempted acquisition of 
Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics’s purchase of Newport News 
Shipbuilding’s submarine design and production operations. It was apparent 
that, in both cases, there was some disagreement among groups within the 
DOD about the merits of these deals. Yet, in both cases, the DOD announced 
that it supported the DOJ’s assessment of the transactions and would testify 
against the mergers in court.84 
 
80 FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp at 23. 
81 Id. 
82 Defense Science Board Task Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry Consolidation, REPORT 
OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
CONSOLIDATION (Apr. 1994).  
83 Kramer, Antitrust Review, supra note 25, at 114. 
84 Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra note 55 at 469-75. 
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As suggested above, the views of the DOD ordinarily are decisive in antitrust 
reviews by the DOJ and the FTC.85 Neither agency desires to appear in a 
courtroom where the DOD will testify on behalf of the merging parties and 
support the transaction. The agencies understand that the DOD’s views about 
what best serves the nation’s security interests likely will be persuasive to 
the federal judge. At least in general terms, the antitrust agencies can have 
confidence that the DOD is sympathetic to their concerns about the potential 
adverse effects of consolidation among its suppliers. The DOD ordinarily 
will be aware of the benefits of competition in depressing prices and 
providing a larger range of design and product choices.86 At times in the past 
decade, DOD officials have expressed concerns that consolidation has so 
reduced the number of suppliers for specific weapon systems that the 
surviving incumbents possess substantial market power and wield it in ways 
that undermine the national interest.87 
 
The DOD is aware of the hazards it may face when it is required to rely upon 
a single supplier. Sometimes, however, the Department may decide that other 
policy considerations are more important. These considerations can include 
ensuring the preservation of certain industrial assets (which may be retained 
with greater certainty through a merger than through a winner-take-all 
competition) and reducing the fixed costs associated with maintaining two 
or more centers of design and production capability.88 
 
The Aerojet/Rocketdyne merger, mentioned above, underscores the crucial 
part that the DOD’s views play in the antitrust review process. The FTC 
concluded that the proposed merger would give Aerojet a monopoly over 
certain control systems and would increase the price of and reduce 
innovation to develop these systems. Consultation with the DOD led the 
Commission to stand down: the agency said it would not challenge the 
 
85 Id. 
86 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note XX, at 1 (“Because the interests of the Department of 
Defense are ordinarily best served by maintaining competitive markets for required products and 
services, it is our policy to oppose business consolidations that severely reduce or eliminate 
competition or that may create unhealthy or unfair competition in those products or services.”). 
87 See Andrew Hunter, Gregory Sanders & Zach Huitink, Evaluating Consolidation and the Threat of 
Monopolies Within Industrial Sectors, in Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium 469, 471 (Naval Postgraduate School, Apr. 30, 2018) (reporting concerns of DOD 
acquisition officials about excessive concentration in the defense supplier base); Bill McConnell, The 
Pentagon finally worries about defense mergers, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 9, 2015, at 22 (Frank Kendall, 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: “With size comes power, and the 
department’s experience with large defense contractors is that they do not hesitate to use this power for 
corporate advantage.”);  Jeffrey P. Bialos, Some Thoughts on DOD’s New Merger Guidance, LAW 360, 
Oct. 19, 2015 (describing new DOD  guidance that states DOD’s skepticism toward mergers of leading 
defense firms  and expressing concerns about adverse effect of future acquisitions on innovation and 
prices), at http://www.law360.com/articles/715411/print?section=competition.  
88 Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 107-08. 
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transaction in light of the DOD’s support for the transaction. In its closing 
letter, the FTC explained that “[i]t has been and continues to be the 
Commission’s practice to defer to the Department of Defense’s assessment 
of [the non-economic] benefits and to accord that assessment significant 
weight in exercising the Commission’s prosecutorial discretion.”89 
 
The DOD’s role as a monopsonist buyer for many defense-related systems 
means that, in some cases (such as Aerojet/Rocketdyne) the antitrust 
authorities must use advocacy and persuasion before the government 
purchasing officials rather than the threat of litigation as the main tools for 
advancing their competition policy preferences. The DOJ and the FTC must 
convince the buyer to weigh competition concerns heavily and to account for 
them in the decision about whether to give the DOD’s support to a proposed 
deal. 
 
Since the mid- to late-1980s, the federal antitrust agencies have accumulated 
extensive experience with joint ventures and mergers involving defense 
companies. These reviews created substantial agency expertise in the defense 
sector and deep awareness of the institutional setting in which government 
purchasing agencies acquire goods and services from private suppliers.  
Moreover, the antitrust reviews gave paramount importance to innovation as 
a foremost concern in merger reviews and developed methodologies to assess 
the likely impact of transactions on the ability and incentive of firms to 
achieve qualitative improvements over time. 
 
In a number of A&D transactions, the antitrust agencies have devoted 
significant attention to vertical issues as well as to horizontal overlaps. In 
Northrop Grumman/Orbital ATK (2008), Northrop Grumman acquired 
Orbital ATK, a defense technologies services company and the principal 
U.S. supplier of solid rocket motors. 90  Among other goals, Northrop 
Grumman made the acquisition to bolster its own position as a provider of 
space vehicles. One focus of the FTC’s inquiry was the possibility that the 
merged entity might deny or impede the access of Northrop Grumman’s 
rivals to Orbital’s solid rocket boosters. To allay the Commission’s concerns, 
Northrop Grumman agreed to create a firewall between the newly acquired 
solid rocket motor unit and the rest of its business, and to sell rocket motors 
to its competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis.  The consent agreement 
 
89 Michael R. Moiseyev, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition – Mergers I, Federal Trade 
Commission, Letter of June 6, 2013 to Susan P. Raps, Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition & 
Logistics), Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/gencorp-inc./united-technologies-
corp./130610moiseyevdodletter.pdf.  
90 Dave Simpson, FTC Clears Northrop’s $9.2B Orbital Buy With Remedies, LAW 360, June 6, 2018, at 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1050770/print?section=competition.  
 18 
allows the DOD to appoint a compliance officer to oversee fulfillment of the 
order’s terms. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S REVIEW OF THE ULA JOINT VENTURE 
 
When the ULA joint venture was notified to the federal agencies, the FTC 
received clearance to conduct the antitrust review based on its larger 
experience in studying the launch vehicle sector. Over the course of its 
investigation in 2005, the FTC formed the view that the transaction was a 
merger to monopoly for mid-to heavy-lift national security launches.91 The 
combination of these assets in a single supplier created a strong presumption 
that the merger would have serious anticompetitive effects by raising the 
prices that government purchasers would pay over time for launches and by 
depressing incentives for Boeing and Lockheed Martin to innovate in 
advancing the state of the art for launch vehicles.92  Had that been the end of 
the analysis, the staff would have emphatically recommended that the 
Commission block the transaction, and the FTC’s board would have agreed. 
 
The DOD had another view. By early 2006, the Department had informed 
the FTC that it supported the venture to improve  reliability. The DOD 
acknowledged the FTC’s concerns about the competitive dangers posed by 
the joint venture,93 but concluded that the superior reliability promised by the 
transaction warranted accepting these risks.94  As noted earlier, declining 
numbers of launches had reduced the amount of work available to the Boeing 
 
91 In its investigation of the ULA joint venture, the Commission unwisely departed from good agency 
practice in one respect.  After the proposed transaction was notified, the FTC issued a second request. 
The ULA partners did not follow the ordinary process of providing the requested materials and 
certifying compliance.  The FTC did not insist that the parties satisfy these requirements – perhaps 
because the parties provided some of the requested items and the agency believed it had sufficient 
information, based on these and other materials, to take a decision.  It is also possible, however, that full 
compliance with the second request might have given the Commission a stronger basis to assess the 
parties’ efficiency arguments and other aspects of the transaction.  The FTC’s failure to demand 
compliance with the second request was an unfortunate lapse. 
92 A few years earlier, Lockheed Martin seems to have acknowledged what can happen when the 
government faces a monopolist.  In June 2003, Lockheed Martin filed a civil antitrust monopolization 
suit against Boeing arguing that Boeing had monopolized a market consisting of “medium, 
intermediate, and heavy-lift launch services for [the] U.S. government.”  Lockheed Martin further 
alleged that Boeing’s position enabled it to exercise market power to the government’s detriment.  
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., 390 F.Supp. 2d 1073 (M.D. Fl. 2005). 
93 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 1 {“Indeed, we have reviewed the Federal Trade 
Commission staff’s analysis of the proposed transaction’s likely effects, and acknowledge that the 
most negative view of the creation of ULA is that it will almost certainly have an adverse effect on 
competition, including higher prices over the long term, as well as a diminution in innovation and 
responsiveness.”). 
94 Id. (“The transaction does . . . present unique national security benefits that in the Department’s 
analysis clearly outweigh the loss of competition, even in the most extreme view of that loss.”). 
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and Lockheed Martin teams. 95  This posed a serious possibility that the 
proficiency of each team would suffer, and the rate of launch failures would 
increase. 96  To the DOD, the joint venture would concentrate design, 
production, and launch experience in a single integrated team and thereby 
sustain high levels of proficiency.97 The same result would apply to the 
launch site preparation operations of the two companies; Greater proficiency 
would generate higher launch reliability. 98  For DOD, this was the vital 
consideration, and it warranted acceptance of a plan that would reduce the 
number of industry participants to one.  NASA also consulted with the FTC 
on the transaction and informed the Commission “the cognizant mission 
directorates” with the space agency “neither support nor oppose the joint 
venture.” 99 
 
A.  Resolution of the Pivotal Competition issues: Efficiency and Entry 
 
The FTC regarded the scale economy, quality, and reliability arguments to 
be genuine and significant.100 There was considerable evidence from the 
production of launch vehicles and other defense systems that subdividing a 
relatively small and declining amount of work between two teams denied 
both teams the experience base needed to be successful. 102  The agency 
 
95 Id. at 3 (“The current and future commercial launch market, including the inability of U.S. firms 
to compete against foreign firms coupled with the low number of national security launches, 
makes it extremely difficult for two competing U.S. providers to maintain separate, competing 
experienced workforces.”) 
96 “Background Information on National Security Space for ULA”, Attachment to Krieg Letter to 
Majoras, supra note 5 at 3 (“Historical data (1973-2003) for both Delta II and Atlas II launches 
demonstrate that the statistical likelihood for launch failure is reduced as launch rate increases.  
At current launch rates for the Delta IV and Atlas V systems, the launch rate for each team is in the 
zone where the failure rate is statistically unacceptable.”).  
97 Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 3 (“The single ULA workforce will benefit from a launch 
tempo, defined as the number of booster cores built in the assembly line and launched per year, 
that would be greater than could be expected for either of the two competing workforces.”). 
98 Id. (noting that “combining launch teams at both coast launch sites will provide the experience 
critical to launch success”). 
99 Michael C. Wholley, General Counsel, NASA, Letter to Randall Long, Federal Trade Commission 
Re: United Launch Alliance (Dec. 16, 2005). 
100 See Kovacic Statement, supra note 6, at 1 (“In reviewing defense industry mergers, competition 
authorities and the DOD generally should apply a presumption that favors the maintenance of at least 
two suppliers for every weapon system or subsystem. . . . The decisive factor that overrides this 
presumption and supports the settlement approved today is the cost of subdividing a small number of 
launches in the face of a national policy that mandates the maintenance of two families of launch 
vehicles. . . . The compelling justification for permitting the ULA transaction to proceed, subject to 
conditions, is its capacity to improve quality in the performance of design, production, and launch 
preparation tasks in a discipline in which operational reliability is a paramount objective.”). 
102 See “Background Information on National Security Space on ULA”, Attachment to Krieg Letter to 
Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 (“Fifty years of launch experience has demonstrated that increased launch 
tempo will reduce risk and increase space launch mission success rates.”);  RAND, NATIONAL 
SECURITY SPACE LAUNCH REPORT xvi (2006) (hereinafter Space Launch Report) (“[G]iven that the 
U.S. government is the only likely customer, the probability that launch demand may drop below a 
demand that will sustain team proficiency for two families is increased, giving rise to questions of 
reliability that often stem from low production rates.”); Jeffrey Drezner, Giles K. Smith, Lucille E. 
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realized that raising the reliability rate for launches from, say, 95 percent to 
98 percent could yield substantial national security benefits. And the agency 
was aware that in past transactions (e.g., Raytheon/Hughes), when faced with 
a strong efficiency justification and a recommendation to clear from the 
DOD, the FTC had permitted a 2 to 1 merger. Yet there was also the 
awareness, based on hundreds of past antitrust reviews, that a single supplier 
does not feel the same urgency to perform well over time as even a firm that 
has one credible competitor. 
 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin also had argued that the joint venture would 
generate substantial cost savings (approximately $150 million per year after 
an initial three-year transition period) by eliminating the need to maintain 
multiple production facilities.  Neither the FTC nor the DOD regarded the 
cost saving arguments to be persuasive.103 
 
During deliberations over the transaction within the DOD and the FTC, 
SpaceX and its chairman (Elon Musk) made appearances before both 
agencies. 104  In his conversations at the FTC, Musk did not ask the 
Commission to block the ULA transaction but instead to insist upon the 
adoption of conditions that would enable SpaceX to obtain government 
contracts that would allow the entrant to build capability to provide launch 
services to government. Musk emphasized that SpaceX was developing a 
business model that, if successful, would greatly reduce the cost of sending 
payloads into space. 105  SpaceX had made substantial investments in 
 
Horgan, Curt Rogers & Rachel Schmidt, MAINTAINING FUTURE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DESIGN 
CAPABILITY 46-51 (RAND R-4199-AF, 1992); Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra 
note 55, at 429. 
103 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 1 (“Although the parties assert that the joint venture 
would generate significant savings for the Department of Defense, our careful review of those savings 
leads us to conclude that the cost savings, while attractive, are not adequate to support the loss of 
competition.);.A contemporaneous report prepared by one of the country’s federally funded research 
and development centers had found that the DOD required substantially more data about the costs of 
Boeing and LM before relying on cost savings as a basis for combining, through ULA, the Atlas and 
Delta families of launch vehicles or performing a down-select to choose a single supplier.  See RAND, 
Space Launch Report, supra note 91, at xviii; see also Andrea Shalai-Esa, Report raises questions about 
rocket alliance, Aug. 16, 2006 (describing study prepared for DOD by RAND Corp.), at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14379478/.  
104 Musk and his legal advisors met with each of the FTC’s members, including the author. 
105 In his biography of Musk, Ashlee Vance describes Musk’s vision for SpaceX: 
 
SpaceX was to be America’s attempt at a clean slate in the rocket business, a 
modernized reset.  Musk felt that the space industry had not really evolved in about 
fifty years.  The aerospace companies had little competition and tended to make 
supremely expensive products that achieved maximum performance.  They were 
building a Ferrari for every launch, when it was possible that a Honda Accord might do 
the trick.  Musk, by contrast, would apply some of the start-up techniques he’d learned 
in Silicon Valley to run SpaceX lean and fast and capitalize on the huge advances in 
computing power and materials that had taken place over the past couple of decades.  
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developing its Falcon series rocket design, but it had yet to carry out a 
successful launch.106 
 
In most antitrust reviews, the FTC would not have regarded the possibility 
of entry and expansion by SpaceX as a basis for approving the merger. There 
were many reasons to discount the company’s prospects for success. 107 
SpaceX had yet to demonstrate that its concept would work in practice; as 
noted above it had yet to carry out a successful test of its Falcon rocket.108  
Even if the company’s early, lighter version of the Falcon succeeded, it 
would be a long and laborious process to gain confidence in the eyes of 
government purchasers, especially the national security customers for launch 
services, and to qualify to carry sensitive national security payloads into 
space.  For decades government buyers of complex aerospace and defense 
systems, in making contract awards, had placed great emphasis on the 
demonstrated capacity of a supplier to carry out difficult design and 
production tasks.109  One could reasonably ask how an untested entrant could 
overcome the predisposition of government buyers to deal only with familiar 
enterprises with proven track records. Ease of entry can overcome 
competition concerns about a highly concentrative merger, but the SpaceX 
entry story seemed a long distance—perhaps a prohibitive distance—from 
accomplishment. 
 
B. The FTC’s Decision Not to Seek to Block the Venture 
 
 
As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated 
with government contractors. 
 
Vance, supra note 12, at 114. This was the message that Musk conveyed to the author during his 
visit to the FTC in connection with the ULA transaction.   
106 SpaceX would not accomplish a successful launch of its Falcon rocket into earth orbit until 
September 2008.  Vance, supra note 12, at 202-03. 
107 See Davenport, Biggest Challenge, supra note 21, at A1 (“The company was never supposed to 
succeed.  Even its founder gave it odds few gamblers would take – 1 in 10.  But Elon Musk decided to 
go all in anyway, investing some $100 million of his own money, over the protests of his friends, family 
and the basic logic that said a private entrepreneur with no experience in spaceflight shouldn’t start a 
rocket company.”). After astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug Hurley returned to Earth on August 2 after 
their Crew Dragon Demo-2 mission to the ISS, Musk said the success of SpaceX was unforeseeable 
when he founded the company in 2002: “To be totally frank, I doubted us, too.  I thought we had maybe 
– when starting SpaceX – maybe had a 10% chance of reaching orbit.  So to those who doubted us I was 
like, ‘well, I think you’re probably right.’” Dave Mosher & Morgan McFall-Johnsen, SpaceX just 
brought 2 NASA astronauts back to Earth in its Crew Dragon spaceship, kicking off “the next era in 
human spaceflight,” BUS. INSIDER, Aug. 2, 2020, at https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-safely-
splashes-down-nasa-astronauts-crew-dragon-demo2-mission-2020-8,  
108  In the early to mid-2000s, Musk’s goal of achieving regular, low-cost access to earth orbit seemed 
unattainable.  See Vance, supra note 12, at 116 (“As good as a cheap launch vehicle sounded, the odds 
of a private citizen building one that worked were beyond remote.”). 
109 See Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 106-07 (discussing importance to government 
purchasers of the contractor’s track record in previous programs). 
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Given the DOD’s support for the merger, the FTC’s options were severely 
constrained. Going to court without the DOD’s support seemed to be a 
formula for a litigation failure.110 To succeed, the agency would have to seek 
to impeach the DOD by attacking the technical details of its analysis, 
questioning the soundness of its professional judgment, or even to cast doubt 
about its motives—suggesting perhaps that the Department had been 
captured by its powerful, legendary suppliers (Boeing and Lockheed Martin) 
and blinded to the possibilities that an unconventional entrant could bring to 
the field.  It appeared unlikely that, given the choice between the views of 
the DOD and the FTC on national security interests, a federal judge would 
embrace the FTC’s position.111 
 
Even if the FTC had prevailed in litigation and obtained a judicial order 
blocking ULA’s formation, the DOD had the ability to foster the creation of 
a ULA equivalent if it desired to consolidate all development and production 
work for heavy launch vehicles in a single firm. The DOD could have 
initiated a “down select” in which it announced its intention to cease 
allocating contract funds to two firms (Boeing and LM) and to issue future 
contract awards to a single firm which would become the exclusive supplier 
to the department.  In that scenario, Boeing and LM would have prepared 
proposals that advanced the case for each to be the survivor of the down 
select. Once the DOD had completed the competition and chosen its sole 
supplier, the winner likely would have absorbed the losing company’s  
valuable launch vehicle resources, skilled personnel and facilities.  
 
In deciding how to proceed in its own investigation and negotiations with the 
DOD, the FTC was aware that the government’s national security purchasing 
agencies ultimately could resort to this procurement strategy to achieve their 
goals if they concluded that having a single supplier best served their 
interests. The DOD was partly constrained in pursuing the down select 
strategy by a national space policy presidential directive that dictated 
maintenance of two separate families of launch vehicles (i.e., Lockheed 
Martin’s Atlas and Boeing’s Delta).112  Nonetheless, the DOD might have 
 
110 This was my perception as a member of the Commission, and a majority of my colleagues shared the 
view. 
111 In an action by the FTC for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger, the federal court 
could take one of essentially two paths to allow the joint venture to proceed.  The court could 
conclude that the efficiency benefits of the parties outweigh the anticompetitive harms posited by 
the FTC, or the court could find, in determining whether the public interest dictated the issuance 
of an injunction, that the national security concerns advanced by the DOD favored clearance of the 
joint venture. 
112 See RAND, Space Launch Report, supra note 91, at xiv-xv (describing National Space Policy 
Transportation directive issued in December 2004); Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 2 
(“To avoid losing the ability to launch critical national security payloads, the National Space 
Transportation Policy requires the Department to sustain two evolved expendable launch vehicles 
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obtained a relaxation of this requirement and allowed a down select to 
proceed. 
 
The FTC decided to close its investigation and clear the transaction after the 
government buyers provided soft indications that they would consider new 
entrants, but no hard concessions embedded in an enforceable order. Did the 
Commission’s participation in the ULA episode make any positive 
contribution to competition for launch vehicles and related services or to the 
quality of decision-making regarding mergers and joint ventures in the 
aerospace and defense industry? The FTC took some steps to mitigate the 
transaction’s possible adverse vertical foreclosure effects. With the DOD, the 
Commission agreed upon settlement terms that would limit the ability of 
ULA to discriminate against future launch services entrants and to 
disadvantage rival suppliers of satellites.113 The ULA parties agreed to these 
terms, and the DOD established a compliance mechanism to see that the 
requirements would be fulfilled. 
 
The Commission also attempted to make the terms of the resolution of the 
matter more transparent.114  It sought and received from the DOD a letter that 
detailed the Department’s reasons for endorsing the transaction.115 In doing 
so, the FTC usefully pressed DOD to put its cards on the table, to go beyond 
vague assertions of a national security interest and to describe more fully 
how the formation of the ULA venture would serve national security goals.  
The DOD letter spelled out the economies of scale rationale for the 
consolidation and spoke, at a high level of generality, of being receptive to 
efforts by new entrants to qualify as suppliers to the national security 
customers.116   The DOD also expressed its confidence that an enhanced 
launch vehicle acquisition strategy and  the application of government 
procurement mechanisms to monitor supplier costs and other aspects of 
contractor operations would ensure that the Department obtained launch 
services from ULA on reasonable terms.117 The letter did not address the 
 
(EELV) until the Department can certify assured access in space through reliance in a single 
vehicle.”). 
113 FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60151; Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 
5, at 1-2. 
114 Federal Trade Commission, Statement of William E. Kovacic, with whom Chairman Deborah Platt 
Majoras and Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Join, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., The Boeing 
Co,., and United Launch Alliance, L.L.C., FTC File No. 051 0165, Docket No. C-4188.  
115 Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5. 
116 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
117 Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 {“We believe that adequate oversight coupled with a 
prudent acquisition strategy can deliver the benefits of the joint venture while limiting the 
competitive risk associated with it.”).  The DOD’s mixed record in applying its cost oversight tools 
did not inspire similar confidence within the Commission.  The strengths and weaknesses of the 
government’s tools for negotiating contract terms and monitoring performance for major weapon 
systems are examined in William E. Kovacic, Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and 
Extensions to Price Caps, 3 J. REG. ECON. 219 (1991). 
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possibility that, with a seemingly uncontestable position as the sole supplier 
of national security launch services, ULA might feel less urgency over time 
to perform at the highest level, notwithstanding the availability to the DOD 
of nominally formidable monitoring tools. 
 
The correspondence between the DOD and the FTC was made public when 
the parties announced the agreement, along with a detailed closing statement 
by the FTC itself. By its insistence on disclosure of the DOD’s rationale, the 
Commission arguably added a valuable element of accountability to DOD 
(and FTC) decision-making and improved public understanding of the 
arguments that shaped the assessment of the transaction. 
 
Finally, the FTC engaged in extensive discussions with the DOD and with 
NASA about measures that could facilitate entry into the launch services 
business in the future. The FTC staff sought to test whether the aspirations 
of SpaceX to qualify as a supplier to government agencies had any genuine 
prospects of success. In conversations with the FTC’s staff and, eventually, 
with the agency’s leadership, the government agencies expressed their 
openness to supporting new entry. Though uncertain about the durability and 
reliability of these expressions of interest, the FTC perceived that the 
government purchasers saw the value of developing a credible alternative to 
ULA. The alternative need not have been fully developed or complete in the 
sense that the entrant could compete effectively to serve all of the national 
security community’s future needs. It was sufficient that the alternative be 
scalable such that the government purchasers could enhance its position if 
ULA lagged in fulfilling the reliability goals that motivated its creation. In 
short, the FTC was convinced that the government purchasers understood the 
potential hazards of being beholden to a single supplier with no credible 
threat to switch. 
 
The give and take between the FTC and the DOD can be seen as a form of 
competition advocacy, with the FTC attempting to persuade another 
government department of how competition could improve the results – in 
quality and price – that public agencies can achieve through the procurement 
process. As described below, one might infer that this advocacy had some 
positive effect within NASA, which became instrumental in opening the door 
for SpaceX to become a significant government supplier. 
 
Thus, with written commitments in a consent order to resolve vertical 
foreclosure issues, and with spoken commitments to use best efforts to 
support new entry, the FTC approved the ULA venture’s formation. 
 
IV. EXPERIENCE FROM 2006 TO THE PRESENT 
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From a competition policy perspective, the consolidation of the nation’s 
MTH launch capacity in the ULA venture was difficult for the FTC to 
swallow and a source of strong institutional discomfort. The Commission 
and its staff recognized that the transaction presented significant competitive 
risks – notably, the creation of a durable, uncontestable monopolist supplier 
of launch vehicles and services essential to national security.118 The agency 
had acute concerns that long term performance in the relevant market would 
suffer unless the government buyers had a credible threat to shift purchases 
away from ULA and engage at least one alternative supplier. The wisdom of 
the FTC’s decision to approve the transaction depended on its assumptions 
that the economies of scale efficiencies would prove to be real and robust, 
and that the possibilities for entry and expansion by SpaceX (or other firms) 
would be more than a mirage. 
 
As described below, both assumptions that underpinned the FTC’s decision 
have been borne out. The most sanguine view of the Commission’s decision 
is that the agency exercised shrewd, farsighted judgment about what it would 
take to preserve competitive options for government buyers, and it took a 
well-calculated risk that SpaceX would prove to be the necessary competitive 
stimulant in the future.  
 
A more doubtful assessment is that the agency embraced the SpaceX entry 
scenario because it had no other choice; it capitulated because the creation 
of a launch vehicle monopoly for government missions was inevitable, either 
because the parties would prevail in court with the DOD’s support, or 
because the DOD, even if the federal district court upheld the FTC’s view 




A. ULA’s Reliability 
 
With stunning effectiveness, ULA has achieved the reliability objectives that 
the parties offered as a major motivation for the venture’s formation.120 As 
Tory Bruno, ULA’s Chief Executive Officer, has observed, reliability is the 
certifying characteristic of the joint venture: “We’re always on time. We 
always work. That’s the core of our company.” 121  ULA is aware that 
 
118 The creation of the joint venture clashed with policy proposals that the author had made 
before joining the Commission.  See Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 102 (“We would apply 
a presumption that . . . the government can derive significant, additional benefits from preserving 
at least two competitive alternative sources for each type of weapon system, and there may be a 
strong case for three or even more in certain critical areas.”). 
120 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (observing that rom the time of its formation through 
July 30, 2020, ULA had accomplished 140 consecutive successful launches).  
121 Craig Mellow, The Other Rocket Man, AIR & SPACE, June/July 2018, at 64, 69. 
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delivering superior reliability is vital at a time when SpaceX now enjoys a 
substantial cost advantage and is offering significant launches to commercial 
and government customers at prices well below ULA’s.122 
 
Would Boeing and Lockheed Martin have achieved a similar success rate 
had ULA not been approved and the two firms had operated independently? 
That is unknowable. There is evidence, however, that the integration of 
capabilities advanced by Boeing and LM as a foundation for more efficient 
operations took place haltingly and incompletely. In a profile of Tory Bruno 
published in 2018, Craig Mellow described the difficulties that ULA faced 
in melding the predecessor organizations into a cohesive team: 
 
The original idea behind ULA was to reap efficiency by combining two formerly competing 
rocket families, Lockheed’s Atlas and Boeing’s Delta. It didn’t quite work out that way. Under 
the joint ULA roof, the two clans remained separate, if not hostile, duplicating management 
functions and costs from top to bottom. “The staffs from the two product lines didn’t really 
mix all that much,” Bruno says. “They had their own cultures.”  He banged his subordinates’ 
heads together, leaving “one-third fewer boxes on the organization chart.”123 
 
In retrospect, the FTC and the DOD should have been more skeptical than 
they were about efficiency claims that depended on the harmonious 
integration of the Boeing and LM rocket teams. The amalgamation of fierce 
rivals into a single enterprise, in almost any institutional setting, ordinarily 
faces strong internal resistance. A full knitting together of the predecessor 
bodies after a merger, and the creation of a new collective spirit, may take 
years to accomplish, if it happens at all.124 The fact that the ULA partners 
recently had engaged in bitter litigation involving competition for launch 
contracts,125  and that Boeing and LM were antagonists in other weapon 
system markets, such as combat aircraft,126 provided further reason to doubt 
that the new venture would benefit significantly from the combination of its 
founders’ rocket production and launch operations organizations. Nothing 
about the relationship between Boeing and LM before they announced the 
ULA venture suggested that the firms would work well together, and the FTC 
 
122 Id. at 69 (reporting that as of mid-2018, “the basic sticker price” for a ULA Atlas V launch was $109 
million compared to $61 million for a SpaceX Falcon 9 launch).   
123 Mellow, supra note 110, at 67. 
124 The examination of hundreds of mergers over the years should have given the FTC a keener 
awareness of the serious problems that postmerger integration poses, even for deals that ultimately are 
by some measure successful. 
125 Several years before the formation of ULA, Lockheed Martin sued Boeing in federal district court in 
Florida for alleged misconduct in connection with competitions to obtain launch contracts with the U.S. 
government.  The LM complaint accused Boeing of violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, the Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal Activities Act, the Sherman Act, and the 
Florida Antitrust Act.  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (M.D. Fl. 
2004).   
126 Boeing currently produces the F-15 and F-18 fighters, and Lockheed Martin produces the F-22 and 
F-35 fighters.  The companies regularly face vie with each other for sales of these and other aircraft 
designs (such as trainers) to the U.S. government and to foreign countries. 
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should have pressed the parties, and the DOD, harder to explain how the 
companies expected to overcome the enmity between them. 
 
There remains the interesting question of how ULA has been able to achieve 
a perfect record of successful launches since the formation of the venture. To 
what extent did the efficiencies that Boeing and Lockheed Martin anticipated 
in 2006 actually come to pass?  Were there efficiency benefits that the parties 
did not anticipate ex ante but nonetheless emerged unexpectedly as the 
venture proceeded? These issues would seem to be  worthy  additional study 
by the DOD and the FTC to improve their understanding of what industrial 
measures improve performance in this dimension. 
 
B. The Successful Development of SpaceX 
 
Has SpaceX evolved into an increasingly credible supply alternative for 
commercial and government purchasers, alike? Unmistakably, it has done so, 
often in a disruptive fashion that has upset prevailing assumptions about 
rocket design, testing, and pricing. In the most general terms, SpaceX 
embraced the role of a maverick untethered by norms that discourage 
experimentation and innovation.127 As Craig Mellow has written:  
 
Among space enthusiasts, [Elon] Musk and the company he founded, SpaceX, are the 
disrupters, the swashbuckling innovators whose cheap, reusable rockets will pave the way 
for an explosion of orbital commerce and creativity. Old Space, according to this 
construction, stays hopelessly mired in the past.128 
 
With its disruptive entry into the space industry, SpaceX has become the 
antidote to any complacency on the part of ULA.129 By some measures, 
SpaceX has become the preeminent U.S. supplier of launch services.130  As 
journalist Irene Klotz observes, a new wave of entry spearheaded by SpaceX 
has given government purchasers a range of options that seemed improbable 
in 2006: 
 
It is a problem the U.S. Air Force once wished it had: multiple companies competing to launch 
its mission-critical satellites into a range of earth orbits.  Now, legacy contractor United 
Launch Alliance . . . is in a fight for its existence as it squares off against SpaceX – which in 
 
127 In describing the relationship between SpaceX and NASA, Christian Davenport has noted the 
“tension between the safety-obsessed space agency and the maverick company run by Musk, a tech 
entrepreneur who is well known for his flair for the dramatic and for pushing boundaries of rocket 
science.”  Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare, supra note 22, at A13.  Davenport adds: “In this culture 
clash, SpaceX is the daring, Silicon Valley-style outfit led by a man who literally sells flamethrowers on 
the Internet and wholeheartedly embraces risk.”  Id.     
128 Mellow, supra note 110, at 64. 
129 Id. at 66-69 (describing how entry and expansion by SpaceX led ULA to alter its business strategy) 
130 For example, in 2018, SpaceX completed 20 missions, over 60% of the U.S. launches for the year.  
Irene Klotz, On the Ascent, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 2018-Jan. 13, 2019, at 80. 
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2016 broke ULA’s monopoly on the military’s space launch business – and new offerings 
from Northrop Grumman and Jeff Bezos’ startup Blue Origin.131 
 
Among other effects, the presence of SpaceX and other launch vehicle 
producers has pressed ULA to reduce the price it offers government buyers 
and to undertake major improvements in its line of launch vehicles.132 
 
SpaceX has performed well in four noteworthy areas of endeavor: 
 
Technical Proficiency. SpaceX has emerged as an innovative force in launch 
vehicle design, production, and operations. 133  Among the most notable 
achievements  is the development of a reusable vehicle that, following a 
launch, can descend to the earth’s surface and land on a platform on land or 
on the sea.134 The company’s customers have welcomed the application of 
this technology (and its favorable cost-saving consequences), and SpaceX 
routinely uses previously launched boosters for its missions.135 SpaceX also 
has developed a reusable spacecraft (the Dragon) that can perform multiple 
deliveries into space over time.136 
 
The company has progressed from the deployment of smaller versions of its 
Falcon launch vehicle to more powerful systems. The most notable of these 
 
131 Irene Klotz, Rocket Rivalry, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 3-16, 2019, at 32 (hereinafter Rocket 
Rivalry). See also Irene Klotz, Game On, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 9-22, 2018, at 44 (stating that 
ULA “is in a fight for survival” in the competition to obtain contracts for the Air Force Launch Service 
Agreement program) (hereinafter Game on). 
132 See Frank Morring, Jr. & Lara Seligman, Getting Up There, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 17-30, 
2017, at 20, 21 (reporting that as SpaceX has injected competition into launches for the Air Force 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, “ULA has slashed the price of the workhorse Atlas V by 
one-third, and says it will continue to drive down costs”); Klotz, Game On, supra note 120, at 44 
(reporting that SpaceX won its first Air Force contract, to deliver a GPS-3 satellite into earth orbit, by 
offering a launch price of $83 million, which was approximately 40% less than the price that ULA 
previously had charged the Air Force). 
133 See, e.g., Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare, supra note 22, at A1, A13 (describing SpaceX 
application of novel techniques for fueling launch vehicles and debate among industry experts about its 
benefits and hazards); Andy Pasztor, Musk’s SpaceX Notches Another Milestone, WALL ST. J., June 5, 
2017, at B4 (reporting SpaceX success in reusing cargo capsule); Andy Pasztor, SpaceX Sticks Rocket 
Landing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9-10, 2016, at B4 (reporting successful trial of landing technique for 
reusable SpaceX launch vehicle). 
134 See Frank Morring, Jr., Reusable Rockets, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 17-30, 2017, at 31 
(hereinafter Reusable Rockets) (describing progress of SpaceX in developing reusable launch vehicles); 
Andy Pasztor, SpaceX Sticks Rocket Landing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9-10, 2016 (reporting SpaceX success 
in vertically landing part of a used Falcon 9 rocket). 
135 See Irene Klotz, Falcon Family Grows, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 22-May 5, 2019, at 12 
(recounting SpaceX success in deploying reusable vehicle technology); First Take, AV. WK. & SPACE 
TECH., July 15-28, 2019 (reporting NASA award of a $50 million contract to launch an X-ray 
observatory atop a previously flown Falcon 9 rocket). 
136 See Guy Norris, Boeing, SpaceX set for Key Commercial Crew Flight Tests, AV. WK. & SPACE 
TECH., Sept. 2-15, 2019, at 51 (reporting on preparations by Boeing and SpaceX for initial tests of their 
crew capsules; noting that SpaceX has flown one of its Dragon cargo capsules three times); Andy 
Pasztor, Musk’s SpaceX Notches Another Milestone, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2017, at B4 (describing 
success of SpaceX in refurbishing its Dragon capsule and relaunching it). 
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is the Falcon-Heavy, which in 2018 carried another Musk-created object (a 
cherry-red Tesla Roadster) into space.137 The development of a more capable 
family of launch vehicles is a major step toward realizing Elon Musk’s vision 
of becoming the preeminent launch services provider to government and 
commercial customers. 
 
Commercial Markets. SpaceX has become an important supplier of launch 
services for commercial enterprises in the communications sector. Key 
milestones have included the successful launch in March 2017 of a 
communications satellite for SES and the launch of communications 
satellites for Iridium and for its own Starlink internet system138 SpaceX has 
helped catalyze reductions in the price of commercial launch services and 
facilitated entry by a host of companies that are seeking to create new 
communications networks with low earth orbit satellites.139 
 
Government Non-Military Launch Services. Since the approval of the ULA 
venture in 2006, SpaceX has become an increasingly significant supplier of 
launch services for NASA.140 In 2008, NASA gave SpaceX a $1.6 billion 
contract to make cargo deliveries to the International Space Station (ISS).141 
The SpaceX Cargo Dragon made its first delivery of cargo to the ISS in 
October 2012.142  In March 2019, SpaceX sent a prototype of the Crew 
Dragon spacecraft to the ISS, setting the stage for the successful flight of the 
Crew Dragon and its astronauts to the ISS in 2020. 143  The successful 
completion of the Crew Dragon Demo-2 mission has underscored the 
leadership that SpaceX now holds in its contest with Boeing to become the 
preeminent supplier of rockets and capsules for human space travel.144 The 
company is now positioned to play a key role in developing other launch 
 
137 The development of the Falcon Heavy is described in Kenneth Chang, Ready for a test flight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Int’l Edition), Jan. 24, 2018, at 8.  
138 Morring, Reusable Rockets, supra note 123, at 21-22; Andy Pasztor, SpaceX Wins Launch Of an SES 
Satellite, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, at B2 (reporting decision by SES SA to give SpaceX a contract to 
launch a communications satellite; cataloguing the increasing portfolio of SpaceX commercial launch 
bookings).  In 2017-2018, SpaceX carried out eight missions in which it successfully delivered 75 
Iridium Next Satellites into orbit.  Irene Klotz, Iridium: A 30-year, Overnight Success Story, AV. WK. & 
SPACE TECH., Nov. 26-Dec.9, 2018, at 38.  For descriptions of the SpaceX Starlink project, see Kenneth 
Chang, SpaceX Satellites Go in Orbit to Test Internet Service, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2019, at B3; Aaron 
Pressman, The Internet Space Race, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 2019, at 9. 
139 Irene Klotz, SmallSat Express, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26-Dec. 9, 2018, at 17. 
140 See, e.g,, Sarah Kaplan, NASA’s new TESS satellite will search galactic neighborhood for planets, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2018, at A4 (reporting the launch into earth orbit by a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket of 
NASA’s Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite).  
141 Andy Pasztor, SpaceX Dragon Capsule Links Up With Space Station, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2012, at 
B8. 
142 Id. 
143 Irene Klotz, SpaceX and NASA Demo-1 Paves Way for Crew Flights to ISS, AV. WK & SPACE TECH., 
Mar. 11-24, 2019, at 46. 
144 Christian Davenport, Musk and SpaceX pull off another once-impossible feat, WASH. POST, May 31, 
2020, at A15. 
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vehicle capabilities that will support other NASA space exploration projects, 
including human spaceflight to the Moon and Mars.145 
 
National Security Launch Services. Not only has SpaceX delivered non-
defense payloads into space,146 it gradually has become a more significant 
participant in the national security segment of launch vehicle services for 
U.S. government agencies.147 In head-to-head competitions with ULA after 
2014, the U.S Air Force awarded SpaceX several national security 
launches.148 The most striking indication of the ascending stature of SpaceX 
with the national security agencies came on August 7, 2020, when the Air 
Force announced that it had selected SpaceX and ULA to receive five-year 
contracts totaling $653 million to launch satellites for the National Security 
Space Launch (NSSL) program.149 As journalist Jeff Foust remarked, the 
NSSL contract award underscored how far SpaceX has come from its early 
days as an aspiring supplier to the national security agencies; “Six years ago, 
SpaceX was the upstart launch company seeking to break United Launch 
Alliance’s monopoly on national security space launches. Now, it’s part of 
the establishment.”150 The rivalry between ULA and SpaceX for national 
 
145 See, e.g., Irene Klotz, SpaceX Aims for Orbital Flights of Prototype Mars Ship Next Year, AV. WK. & 
SPACE TECH., Oct. 14-27, 2019, at 67 (describing development of the SpaceX Starship, which the 
company envisions to be a low-cost, reusable system to transport humans into deep  space); Guy Norris, 
SpaceX’s Starhopper Verifies Raptor Performance for Starship, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 2-15, 
2019, at 28 (describing successful test of technology demonstrator incorporating Raptor engine that will 
be used in the Starship system).  See Klotz, NASA’s New Era, supra note 22, at 23 (quoting Elon Musk 
after the successful launch of the SpaceX Crew Dragon with two American astronauts on board: “This 
is hopefully the first  step on a journey toward a civilization on Mars and life becoming interplanetary 
for the first time in the 4.5 billion year history of the Earth.:); Andy Pasztor, Musk’s Mars Shot: To Red 
Planet by 2024, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2017 (describing SpaceX plans to develop reusable 
spaceship to travel to Mars); Guy Norris, Leave it to Us, AV. WK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 9, 2010 
(Quoting Tom Markusic, director of the SpaceX rocket development facility in McGregor, Texas: 
“Mars is the ultimate goal of SpaceX.”).   
146 See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, SpaceX Dragon Capsule Links Up With Space Station, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 
2012, at B8.  
147 See Irene Klotz & Jen DiMascio, SpaceX Loses Out on U.S. Air Force Next-Gen Launcher 
Development, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 15-28, 2018, at 38 (describing SpaceX inventory of 
national security launches through the fall of 2018). 
148 Irene Klotz, SpaceX Falcon Heavy Selected for Classified U.DS. Air Force Launch, AV. WK & 
SPACE TECH. (Electronic Daily Edition: June 24, 2018).  In 2018, for example SpaceX performed two 
national security missions for U.S. military organizations, including a global positioning satellite.  Irene 
Klotz, Next Big Step, AV. WK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 14-27, 2019, at 26. 
149 Department of Defense, Contracts for Aug. 7, 2020 (announcing Air Force contract awards), at 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2305454/. ULA received task 
orders for $337 million for the NSSL Phase 2 contract, and SpaceX received task orders for $316 
million for the NSSL Phase 2 contract.  The two companies beat Blue Origin and Northrop 
Grumman, which also submitted bids for the NSSL Launch Service Procurement.  Sandra Erwin, 
Pentagon picks SpaceX and ULA to remain its primary launch providers, SPACENEWS (Aug. 7, 2020), 
at https://spacenews.com/pentagon-picks-spacex-and-ula-to-launch-national-security-satellites-
for-next-five-years/.  
150 Jeff Foust, News Analysis: With Pentagon award, SpaceX joins the establishment, SPACENEWS (Aug. 
7, 2020), at https://spacenews.com/news-analysis-with-pentagon-award-spacex-joins-the-
establishment/.  
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security missions, once exclusively the domain of ULA, promises to remain 
intense.151 
 
The path to the successful outcomes described here has not been entirely 
smooth from either a technical or institutional perspective. SpaceX has 
experienced spectacular, unnerving failures with boosters and capsules.152 In 
each instance, the company has treated operational failures as means to 
discover the path to ultimate success; it has strived to identify the causes of 
each failure and appears to have taken effective corrective measures.153 Some 
of the company’s critics – including its rival, ULA – have suggested that 
SpaceX has taken too casual an attitude toward risk and underinvested in a 
testing regime that might reduce operational failures.154 Such criticism often 
comes with a recognition that SpaceX has injected extraordinary vitality into 
the space industry and that pre-existing norms accepted by the government 
purchasers and its suppliers too heavily favored caution at the expense of 
innovation and technological progress, at least in the case of unmanned space 
flight.155 
 
The institutional hurdles to becoming a valued supplier to government 
agencies also have been formidable. The relationships of SpaceX with its 
U.S. government customers have not been friction free. From time to time, 
SpaceX has accused NASA and the DOD of taking steps to diminish the 
company’s access to government funding and to launch services contracts 
and to reinforce the preeminence ULA enjoyed at the time of its formation 
 
151 See Christian Davenport, SpaceX pushes ahead even as satellite questions arise, WASH. POST, Jan. 
18, 2018, at G1, G8 (hereinafter Satellite Questions) (describing competition between ULA and SpaceX 
for national security launches). 
152 See id. at G8 (recounting failed SpaceX launches); Vance, supra note 12, at 367-68 (same); see also 
Mosher & McFall-Johnsen, supra note 96 (quoting Elon Musk: “It took us four attempts just to get to 
orbit with Falcon 1 . . . People told me this joke: How do you make a small fortune in the rocket 
industry? ‘You start with a large one’ is the punch line.”). 
153 Irene Klotz, SpaceX Pinpoints Crew Dragon Abort System Flaw, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 29-
Aug. 18, 2019, at 41 (reporting SpaceX efforts to identify and correct source of failure in unmanned test 
of abort system for Crew Dragon spacecraft);  Irene Klotz, Falcon Flying High, AV. WK. & SPACE 
TECH., June 12-25, 2017, at 38 (reporting SpaceX efforts to correct design flaws that had caused 
accidents involving its Falcon launch system). 
154 See Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare, supra note 22 (describing criticism that SpaceX business 
philosophy slights serious risks); Mellow, supra note 110 (same).  
155 See Mellow, supra note 110, at 66 (Quoting Troy Bruno, head of ULA’s Atlas and Delta rocket unit: 
“Elon Musk is someone you have to absolutely admire for the excitement he has brought back to space.  
Space was getting kind of boring for the general public.”); see also Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare, 
supra note 22, at A13 (quoting Greg Autry, Assistant Professor of Clinical Entrepreneurship, Marshall 
School of Business, University of Southern California and Member of the Presidential Transition 
Agency Review Team for NASA in 2016-2017: “NASA is supposed to be a risk-taking organization.  
But every time we would mention accepting risk in human spaceflight, the NASA people would say, 
‘But, oh, you have to remember the scar tissue’ -- and they were talking about the two shuttle disasters.  
They seemed to have become victims of the past and unwilling to try anything new, because of that scar 
tissue.”).    
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in 2006.156 On two occasions, SpaceX has sued the Air Force on the ground 
that it unreasonably excluded SpaceX from contract awards. In 2014, SpaceX 
filed a bid protest to challenge sole source awards the Air Force had made to 
ULA for heavy launch contracts.157 The protest appears to have led the Air 
Force to open more of its business to competitive bidding. 158  In 2019, 
SpaceX filed a bid protest to challenge the decision by the Air Force in 
October 2018 not to award ULA a contract for the Phase I Launch Services 
Agreement.159 The Air Force and SpaceX settled this dispute on terms that 
appear to have enabled the company to participate in the Air Force program. 
There also have been suggestions that, for the Crew Commercial program to 
send astronauts to the ISS, NASA unjustifiably has subjected SpaceX to 
more exacting safety audits than Boeing.160 
 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD 
 
A. Government Procurement as a Stimulus for Competition 
 
The success of SpaceX has depended crucially upon the fulfillment by the 
government buyers of their soft commitment in 2006 to consider SpaceX as 
an alternative to ULA. NASA was the pivotal actor in this process. The 
agency encouraged the development of a new business model that relied 
principally on the private sector to devise, deploy, and operate space 
vehicles. 161  Journalist Richard Waters well describes the significance of 
contributions of NASA and the entrants it helped inspire: 
 
The emergence of a start-up space industry, led by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’s Blue 
Origin, has led to a new symbiosis in space. The tech groups see Nasa as an important early 
customer as they pursue their grand long-term visions – while the space agency has found 
ways of riding on the back of their development work rather than creating the technology for 
its programs from scratch.162 
 
 
156 See Davenport, Biggest Challenge, supra note 21, at A24 (describing collusions between SpaceX and 
its chief government buyers, NASA and the DOD). 
157 See Amy Butler & Svitak Farnborough, Compeitive Thrust, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 21, 2014, 
at 31 (describing SpaceX bid protest against Air Force). 
158 See Foust, supra note 139 (observing that SpaceX abandoned its protest in 2015 “after winning 
concessions from the Air Force, such as speeding up certification of the Falcon 9 and making more 
launches available for competition”).  
159 See Klotz, Rocket Rivalry, supra note 120, at 32.  The Air Force awarded LSA contracts to ULA 
subsidiary United Launch services, Blue Origin, and Northrop’s Orbital Sciences Corp. 
160 See Christian Davenport, NASA safety reviews different in scope for Boeing, SpaceX, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 29, 2019, at A19.  
161 Jim Bridenstine, NASA’s Administrator, has described the agency’s approach in these terms: 
“We don’t want to purchase, own, and operate the hardware the way we used to.  We want to be 
one customer of many customers in a very robust commercial marketplace in low-Earth orbit.  
This is the next era in human spaceflight, where NASA gets to be the customer.  We want to be a 
strong customer, we want to be a great partner.  But we don’t want to be the only ones that are 
operating with humans in space.”  Mosher & McFall-Johnsen, supra  note 96. 
162 Richard Waters, Nasa taps private sector to return to Moon, FIN. TIMES, July 20-21, 2019, at 13. 
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From 2006 onward, NASA gave increasingly stronger signals that it would 
entertain offers from SpaceX to provide non-military launch services and it 
gave the company contracts for smaller launches that foreshadowed 
additional work in the future. In the first term of his presidency, Barack 
Obama made a bold and controversial decision to rely chiefly on a not yet 
well developed commercial space sector to provide an essential foundation 
for the nation’s space exploration program.163  From the initiation of the 
Mercury program through the end of the Space Shuttle programs in 2011, the 
United States purchased hardware and services from external suppliers; 
NASA owned the space system assets and operated the facilities from which 
they were launched into space.  The new approach anticipated that private 
firms would build launch vehicles and spacecraft and send them into space 
(often using launch pads leased from or acquired from the government). 
 
An important step toward creating an environment that enabled entry by 
SpaceX and other private firms into the launch services sector was NASA’s 
creation of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (“COTS”) 
program.164 COTS anticipated that private firms would the ability to provide 
space transportation capabilities and provide, beginning in 2011, launches to 
supply the International Space Station (“ISS”).165 This was the first in a series 
of measures that spurred the development of SpaceX and other new entrants, 
including Blue Origin, which is owned by Jeff Bezos, the founder of 
Amazon. 
 
Encouraged by a largely successful series of launches, NASA in 2014 took 
the still bolder step of selecting SpaceX, along with Boeing, to participate in 
its Commercial Crew Program, which NASA would rely on private firms to 
build and operate the next generation of human space transportation 
systems.166 Although Boeing received a larger share of NASA funds for the 
 
163 On this policy adjustment, see Christian Davenport, The spacecraft was in trouble.  The White House 
was watching … and Elon Musk’s SpaceX had to deliver, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2018, at G1; 
Davenport, Biggest Challenge, supra note 21, at A24. 
164 See Steven Mumma & Natalie Imfeld, Advancing the Nation’s Space Program through Commercial 
Space Services Acquisition, CONT. MGM’T, Feb. 2014, at 16 (describing NASA’s creation of COTS); 
Guy Norris & Madhu Unnikrishnan, In the Dragon’s Den, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 29, 2010, at 
28 (same). 
165 Id.  Over the past decade, NASA has used three cargo carriers – SpaceX, the Orbital ATK division of 
Northrop Grumman, and Sierra Nevada Corporation – to make deliveries to the International Space 
Station.  Irene Klotz, Passing the Torch, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 18-July 1, 2018, at 58-59 
(hereinafter Passing the Torch). 
166 Klotz, NASA’s New Era, supra note 22, at 26 (quoting Wayne Hale, former manager of NASA’s 
Space Shuttle program: “The Commercial Crew program has been a great experiment by NASA to see 
if commercial companies can do this particular job.”); Irene Klotz, Crew Dragon Debuts, AV. WK & 
SPACE TECH., May 4-17, 2020, at 14 (hereinafter Crew Dragon Debuts); Tony Reichart, Astronauts, 
Your Ride Is Here, AIR & SPACE, Aug. 2018, at 40.  The origin and evolution of the Commercial Crew 
Program are described in Klotz, Passing the Torch, supra note 151, at 58-61. 
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program,167  SpaceX was first to return U.S. astronauts to space with an 
American-made vehicle launched from the United States.168 SpaceX is one 
of three firms (along with teams headed by Blue Origin and Dynetics) that 
NASA has chosen to compete to provide the space agency with a system to 
land humans on the Moon.169 
 
In taking these steps and other steps, NASA departed in significant respects 
from the stereotype of government buyers as being captured by commercial 
interests, exceedingly risk-averse in program design, and incapable of 
creative thinking that uses the power of public purchasing to stimulate 
competition among suppliers. Over the past fifteen years, NASA has pursued 
a conscious strategy to encourage entry that expands the number of quality 
of centers of inventive and productive activity that can serve its needs.  
NASA also has shown patience in tolerating occasional failures that entrants 
must experience to gain capability and achieve dramatic design 
breakthroughs and improvements in performance.  
 
The NASA experience with SpaceX warrants close study by other 
government purchasing authorities and competition policy agencies as a 
model of how well-calculated risk taking in the expenditure of public funds 
can facilitate procompetitive entry by new suppliers, even into unusually 
difficult technological domains. NASA’s successful pro-entry strategy is the 
most recent illustration of a more general phenomenon documented in a 
number of modern studies: that public procurement, in outlays for research 
and development, hardware, and services, has considerable power to 
stimulate valuable innovation and rivalry in the private sector. 170  These 
possibilities are especially important today in sectors that might seem, for the 
moment, to be impervious to entry and expansion by new firms. 
 
B. The Role of the Antitrust Agencies 
 
The ULA competition review in 2006 and the evolution of the launch vehicle 
sector suggests several features of good practice for antitrust agencies (and 
public procurement authorities) in evaluating the competitive effects of 
mergers. The experience underscores the value of systematic collection of 
 
167 NASA awarded Boeing and SpaceX $4.2 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively.  Klotz, Crew Dragon 
Debuts, supra note 155, at 14.  
168 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
169 Irene Klotz, Lunar Landers, Av. Wk. & Space Tech., May 18-31, 2020, at 14.   
170 See, e.g., Charles Fishman, ONE GIANT LEAP – THE IMPOSSIBLE MISSION THAT FLEW US TO THE MOON 
297-306 (2019) (describing how NASA’s Apollo program spurred the development of the modern 
semiconductor industry); Daniel P. Gross & Bhaven N. Sampat, Inventing the Endless Frontier: The 
Effects of the World War II Research Effort on Post-War Innovation (Harvard Business School 
Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 20-126, June 2020) (analyzing how government R&D 
expenditures in World War II set foundation for technological progress in post-war period). 
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data and analysis about past experience. The consideration of arguments in 
2005-2006 about reliability improvements arising from the formation of 
ULA benefitted enormously from work done by the DOD, by RAND, and 
other researchers about scale economies and learning in the design and 
production of complex systems.171 The data provided confidence that ULA’s 
creation could yield important improvements in performance. 
 
The ULA case also indicates the value for policy making of interagency 
cooperation that enables distinct institutions with shared or complementary 
policy duties to diagnose problems and devise solutions. The DOD 
collaboration with the FTC facilitated a well-informed decision making 
process and helped both institutions apply their skills usefully to the problem.  
The analysis also profited greatly from the accumulation of relevant expertise 
in both agencies over time: in the DOD, greater knowledge about the 
substance and process of antitrust law, and in the FTC, greater knowledge 
about the aerospace and defense industries, and about procurement decision 
making in the DOD. 
 
 C. Meaningful Disclosure 
 
The ULA experience suggests the value of a transparent revelation of the 
reasons for decisions taken. The ULA decision made  the DOD and the FTC 
nervous, and there were temptations to offer less informative, general 
explanations of the reasons for the outcome. A more complete description of 
the reasons for a difficult decision exposes the agency to more second-
guessing, but it injects needed discipline into the decision making process 
itself. By putting their cards face up on the table, and setting out the key 
assumptions behind the ULA decision, the DOD and the FTC enabled 
students of competition law and defense acquisition to better understand 
what happened, to see what worked, to identify what failed, and to do it better 
the next time.172 
 
That said, the transparency surrounding the decision by the DOD and the 
FTC could have been greater.  For example, the FTC could have said more 
about its doubts that new entry would take place to constrain ULA and its 
concerns about the efficacy of DOD monitoring and oversight tools to press 
 
171 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
172 With the FTC’s encouragement, the DOD  explained why it supported the DOJ’s lawsuit to block 
General Dynamics’ purchase of Newport News Shipbuilding, where the fear was that a merger to 
monopoly would reduce innovation in the design and production of submarines. See Department of 
Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Files Suit to Block General Dynamics’ Purchase of Newport 
News Shipbuilding (Oct 23, 2001); Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing why “the 
national security interests present in this transaction distinguish the Department’s analysis of this 
transaction from our analysis of the 2001 acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding by General 
Dynamics, which would have resulted in a nuclear shipbuilding monopoly”). 
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ULA to control costs.  Careful documentation of initial expectations provides 
an important foundation for ex post evaluations that can illuminate how 
antitrust agencies (and procurement authorities) can improve decision 
making in future merger analysis. 
 
D.  Innovation in Merger Analysis 
 
The large experience that the DOJ and the FTC have gained from reviewing 
mergers in the aerospace and defense industry can be a valuable source of 
insights into how antitrust policy can account for innovation issues in other 
sectors. The evaluation of the ULA transaction and numerous other A&D 
mergers suggests several focal points for study of innovation effects in any 
transaction. 173  An essential starting point is to identify the industrial 
competencies needed to design and produce the  product or service in 
question.  The second step is to determine which firms currently possess 
those competencies and to assess the strength of each competency within the 
firm. For technologically dynamic sectors, for example, the firm’s 
proficiency often depends on the volume of its expenditures for research and 
development and the types of R&D projects it is undertaking to stay at the 
frontier of the technical state-of-the art.  A third step is to assess the firm’s 
capacity to take innovative ideas, translate them into inventive designs, and 
produce the product or service in question.  Past success in running a 
successful production program—solving problems associated with the 
organization of the work flow, the assembly of component parts, and the 
application of quality control techniques—can be a valuable indicator of the 
firm’s ability to design products that will work and build them effectively.  
A fourth step is to evaluate the firm’s proficiency in accomplishing post-
production maintenance and repair functions and in devising and installing 
upgrades that account for experience gathered in the course of using the 
product and responding to changing conditions.  
 
The DOJ and FTC experience with aerospace and defense transactions has 
involved many applications of this basic framework. The know-how 
accumulated from A&D merger reviews is readily transferable to the analysis 
of mergers in other technologically dynamic sectors, extending from the 
earliest stages of the R&D pipeline to the routine deployment of the products 
or services. 
 
E.  Case Retrospectives 
 
 
173 These are reviewed in Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra note 55, at 476-80; 
Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 103-20. 
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The analysis used in this Article suggests a basic, useful approach that 
competition agencies can use to evaluate and improve their decision making 
in merger reviews. The essence of the approach is to examine the 
assumptions and predictions that guided the agency’s analysis, to compare 
those assumptions and predictions to actual experience, and, where actual 
experience deviates from the predicted outcome, or contradicts the initial 
assumptions, to ask what the agency might have missed in its original 
assessment and what it should look for in conducting future reviews.   
 
Merger analysis sometimes involves making difficult judgments about likely 
future events based on information that is inevitably incomplete or lends 
itself to conflicting interpretations. Retrospectives that compare assumptions 
and predictions to actual results can improve future inquiries by identifying 
overlooked factors or providing a better basis to judge whether conceptual 
possibilities (e.g., the realization of efficiency benefits) are likely to come to 
pass.  The value of the retrospective depends heavily on the completeness 
and honesty with which the agency documents its analysis, along with key 
assumptions and predictions, and tests its analysis against actual outcomes. 
 
The identification of actual results may benefit from collecting information 
ex post from the merged entity and other industry participants.  One can even  
imagine convening discussions, after enough time has passed, in which the 
government decisionmakers (here, the FTC and the DOD) and the private 
parties and their advisors review the decision making process and the results 





By combining the nation’s MTH launch capability for U.S. government 
missions into a single enterprise, the creation of the ULA joint venture 
contradicted the basic presumptions that the federal antitrust agencies 
ordinarily brought to the analysis of transactions in the aerospace and defense 
sector. The agency responsible for the antitrust review of the transaction, the 
Federal Trade Commission, had strongly disfavored mergers to monopoly.  
Departures from this policy had been rare and had required exceptional 
justifications.  The Department of Defense endorsed the ULA venture and 
probably would have testified in favor of its approval had the FTC chosen to 
go to court to enjoin the deal.  The DOD’s support created powerful pressure 
for the FTC to acquiesce, and the agency allowed the transaction to proceed 
subject to conditions that addressed vertical features of the venture. 
 
A plausible efficiency rationale supported the DOD’s support for the ULA 
venture and influenced the FTC’s assessment.  A decline in the number of 
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launches for U.S. government customers threatened to deny the ULA 
partners, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the level of activity needed to 
maintain the proficiency of their design, production, and launch teams at the 
highest levels.  Thus, the continued subdivision of launches between the two 
companies could undermine their reliability and result in an unacceptable 
number of launch failures for government missions.  
 
A large body of experience from previous aerospace programs indicated that 
concerns about learning and scale economies were not an illusion.  Yet the 
DOD and the FTC still had to confront the possibility that, at some point after 
the joint venture’s formation, the ULA partners might experience a loss of 
urgency to control costs and, more important, achieve qualitative 
improvements in their launch systems.  How would government purchasers 
motivate the joint venture to improve performance if they had no credible 
threat to switch to an alternative supplier?  What was the fallback for the 
government if ULA, perceiving itself to be the only means for the 
government to launch payloads into space, shirked? 
 
Before closing its inquiry, the FTC sought assurances from the DOD and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration that the government 
purchasers would seek to qualify other firms to provide launch services.  The 
DOD and NASA acknowledged the dangers of relying on a single supplier 
(ULA), but they provided only spoken assurances—no written 
commitments—to exercise best efforts to encourage entry by other firms into 
this technologically complex and capital intensive industry. No company 
appeared to be an especially attractive candidate to succeed as a new entrant, 
even with encouragement from the DOD or NASA. SpaceX made 
presentations to the FTC and predicted that it could use innovative rocket 
designs to surpass ULA if it received launch services contracts from the 
government purchasers.  Yet, at the time of the FTC’s antitrust review, 
SpaceX had yet to carry out a successful launch of its rocket, the Falcon.      
    
Thus, aided by the DOD’s formidable institutional support, a plausible 
efficiency justification, and a fragile possibility for new entry into the launch 
services sector, the ULA venture received antitrust clearance.  To the relief 
of the government actors (certainly for the FTC and the author, and probably 
for the DOD), experience over the past fifteen years has been astonishingly 
positive.  ULA has achieved an unblemished record of successful launches 
since its creation, though it is unclear that Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
achieved the smooth integration of teams that the parties held out as the 
foundation for improved reliability. And SpaceX has thrived. Even the 
hardiest optimist could not have imagined in 2006 that SpaceX and other new 
entrants into rocketry would have established themselves, by 2020, as 
credible alternatives to ULA as suppliers of launch services to the U.S. 
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government.  On the basis of its success to date in launching human and non-
human payloads, SpaceX arguably has drawn even with, if not surpassed, 
ULA in the race to become the country’s (and the world’s) preeminent launch 
services provider.  
  
To recite this favorable series of events is not to say that continued success 
is inevitable. The history of space exploration has made clear that its 
participants, government agencies and commercial enterprises alike, can take 
nothing for granted. There are many tests ahead to determine whether 
SpaceX or firms such as Blue Origin and Orbital ATK (now owned by 
Northrop Grumman) can demonstrate the sustainability of a new, more 
commercially oriented business model for launch services. But it is 
appropriate to take a moment to recognize that the ULA partners and SpaceX 
thus far have accomplished what they set out to do in 2006, and that the 
hesitant spoken promises of best efforts that the DOD and NASA gave the 
FTC ripened into a series of procompetitive measures that facilitated entry. 
 
Beyond the launch services sector, the ULA experience provides some 
guidance for future policymaking by the antitrust agencies and government 
purchasers.  The developments with ULA, SpaceX, and other commercial 
launch services firms were not the product of mere luck.  The DOD and the 
FTC applied their knowledge of the aerospace industry to make 
sophisticated, principled judgments about the possible learning curve and 
scale economies rationales that Boeing and Lockheed Martin offered as bases 
for creating ULA.  This highlights the benefits that agencies can realize from 
applying expertise gained from having processes and organizational methods 
that bring past experience to bear upon the analysis of new problems. 
 
Also noteworthy for future merger analysis is the positive role that the 
government purchasers, first NASA and then the DOD, played in providing 
opportunities for SpaceX to develop as a supplier of launch services for 
government missions.  The government buyers understood the difficulties 
they would face if they did not encourage new entry as an option to ULA and 
a stimulus for innovation in the design of space launch systems.  The 
establishment of a commercial space services sector has broader 
implications, as it demonstrates how creative procompetitive public 
procurement policies can diversify highly concentrated markets and catalyze 
unanticipated improvements in products and services.   
 
NASA, in particular, embraced an entrepreneurial approach that required the 
agency to modify longstanding methods for obtaining launch services.  This 
experience should motivate procurement policymakers, in Congress and in 
government agencies, to reassess existing views about government 
procurement and the benefits and costs of having public purchasing bodies 
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experiment with novel techniques.  The ULA experience suggests there is an 
untapped potential for public procurement to boost competition that 
improves the nation’s wellbeing, but the realization of the potential will 
require the use of methods that are novel and in some senses more risky that 
traditional procurement approaches.   
 
If the nation is willing to accept, as it should, more innovation and risk taking 
in the procurement process, it will have to acknowledge that innovation and 
risk-taking sometimes result in program failures. We can respond to failures 
in one of two basic ways. We can accept such failures as a necessary price to 
pay for the good results that innovation and risk taking ultimately can yield, 
or we can take the failures as proof that cautious adherence to existing 
routines is the only appropriate way to spend public funds. To do the latter 
wrings creativity and imagination out of our public procurement system, at a 
great cost.174 Perhaps the ULA/SpaceX experience can embed in our minds 
how the willingness to take well-calculated risks (which differs considerably 
from simple throw-of-the-dice gambling) and to learn from the failures that 
sometimes occur can open the door to product and service breakthroughs that 
transform industries for society’s great benefit. 
 
The evaluation of the ULA transaction in 2005–2006 also underscores a 
consideration that should be paramount in the thinking of the antitrust 
agencies and the government purchasers when examining future proposed 
mergers that will have a highly concentrative effect, such as reducing the 
number of suppliers to two firms or a single survivor. What will the 
government buyers do if the remaining firm or firms perform inadequately—
for example, by exercising weak discipline over costs, failing to provide 
desired levels or quality, or showing little imagination or initiative in 
developing new technologies or designs?  It seems that a vital element of the 
answer to this question is always to think in terms of fostering one or more 
alternatives.  These options need not be immediately available to be 
effective, as the emergence of SpaceX from 2006 onward suggests.  For an 
incumbent supplier, the buyer’s conscious attention to encouraging new 
entry is an antidote to complacency. For the buyer, pro-entry policies may 
create unimagined possibilities for addressing the government’s needs. For 
these reasons, the ULA and SpaceX story deserves careful, continued study 
by competition policy specialists and procurement policymakers for decades 
to come.      
 
174 Some of the country’s most impressive, innovation-rich experiences in the aerospace and defense 
fields have emerged from entrepreneurial risk-taking by government agencies, their procurement teams, 
and private suppliers.  Before achieving success, the government and its contractors often had to 
overcome major setbacks.  See, e.g., EYE IN THE SKY: THE STORY OF THE CORONA SPY SATELLITES 
(Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon & Brian Latell eds., 1998) (essays recounting the development and 
deployment of the Corona reconnaissance satellite system). 
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